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CHAPTER I 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
  
 
El sector cafetero ha jugado un papel de primer orden en el desarrollo económico, 
político y social de Colombia en los últimos cien años. 
               (Junguito and Pizano 1997)1 
  
In late September of 2010, over 200,000 Colombians headed to the polls to cast 
votes for their preferred candidates. These candidates, however, were not seeking 
positions in the national or departmental legislatures, but rather were competing for the 
opportunity to represent their fellow coffee farmers in the National Federation of 
Colombian Coffee Growers (FNCC), a government-supported organization designed to 
serve the interests of those involved in Colombia’s main agricultural product. Since its 
creation in 1927, and especially since the ratification of the first International Coffee 
Agreement (ICA) in October 1963 (Akiyama and Varangis 1990), the Federation has had 
a profound impact on Colombian politics, economics, and society, serving in many 
respects as an ‘alternative government’ that carriers out the responsibilities of the state 
across many areas of the country. 
No shortage of research exists on the influence the Coffee Federation, and more 
generally, the coffee industry, has had on Colombian politics and society over the last 
150 years. Indeed, it is this economic sector that has been credited for helping the 
Colombian economy rebound after war and depression and it is because of this sector that 
much of the world knows about this mid-sized Andean country. As will become apparent 
                                                        
1 “The coffee sector has played a role of the first order in the economic, political and social development of 
Colombia in the last 100 years.” (Translation by author) 
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in this dissertation, the quote above does not exaggerate— it is impossible to talk about 
Colombian political, social, or economic development and progress without mentioning 
the coffee sector or the FNCC (or FEDECAFE as it often referred to). However, although 
it is widely accepted that both are of utmost importance in understanding Colombia more 
broadly, once one begins to ask “how” exactly these institutions have had such an effect, 
the responses become less definitive. This is not to say that no empirical research has 
been done on the causes and effects of this institution; indeed, much ink has been spilled 
trying to understand the contemporary FNCC (Junguito and Pizano 1991, 1994, 1997; 
Ortiz 1999; London 1997, 1999, 2002; UNDP 2003). There remains, however, much 
more to be done in order to better understand the impact of this powerful, non-
governmental political and economic institution on the lives of everyday Colombians. 
In this dissertation, I seek to fill one of the knowledge gaps that exist in regards to 
the FNCC and its effects on the Colombian political process. For decades, the Coffee 
Federation has had a strong presence throughout many of the country’s coffee growing 
municipalities. Although its presence and the role of its staff was primarily to assist 
coffee growers in optimizing their coffee output, the FNCC was also tasked with 
providing many of the goods and services to a municipality’s residents that are normally 
thought to be under the purview of the state. Because of the Federation’s dual 
organizational structure, one part is administrative and not directly accountable to 
members while the second is comprised of bodies of representative actors selected by the 
group’s roughly 500,000 members. From this, it becomes quickly apparent to an 
interested observer that the group should affect the behaviors and attitudes of 
municipality’s population in some way. The question, however, is how? 
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I argue that the Coffee Federation is a continuation of a peculiar state-society 
institutional arrangement found throughout Latin America. In the first part of the 20th 
century, state-society relations in Latin America came to reflect the corporatist model 
whereby society is organized into clearly delineated professional and vocational 
associations (or corporations) that serve as citizens’ avenues into the political world. 
Although scholars (Schmitter 1974; Malloy 1974, 1977; O’Donnell 1977) theorized that 
this peculiar institutional arrangement significantly affected Latin Americans’ political 
lives and relationships with the state, others (Hagopian 1998) noted the incompatibility of 
corporatism with the ideals of the region’s dual transition in the 1980s and 90s. 
Consequently, corporatist organizations were expected to fade away in time. Despite 
expectations, corporatism is a resilient and enduring feature of Latin American culture 
and society and has thrived as an economic and social force into the 21st century. While 
the institutional characteristics of corporatism have been well studied, little empirical 
work has sought to examine the impact that such an institution has on mass behaviors and 
attitudes. At its core, Latin American corporatism was (and perhaps still is) a means by 
which governments depoliticize and “control” the masses. Although procedural 
democracy has undoubtedly taken hold in Latin America in the past 30 years, what is less 
clear is the influence of this durable and lasting institution on contemporary behaviors 
and attitudes.  
I find that instead of fading away into the less than democratic past, corporatism 
has, like other institutions, successfully adapted to the region’s new realities of open-
market economic systems and democratic governance. Therefore, in the past, 
organizations such as the FNCC might have sought to lend legitimacy to the government 
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while simultaneously depressing mass behaviors. In 21st century Latin America, such 
organizations, while still seeking to legitimize the State, also promote mass participation 
in conventional modes of political behavior while seeking to prevent participation in 
those activities which might be less convenient for governments and political elites. 
Using contemporary subnational Colombian public opinion data, I find this to be 
precisely the case. In municipalities where the Federation is, in effect, the ‘alternative 
government’, levels of legitimacy accorded the state among the residents are on par with 
those municipalities where the State is very active and robust. In these municipalities, 
levels of participation in conventional political behaviors are no different, or, at times 
higher, than in other, similar municipalities; however, nonconventional behaviors, such as 
protest participation are depressed in these areas.  
This study is novel in a number of ways. First, state-society relations, especially 
corporatism, have typically been studied at the national or cross-national level. By 
‘scaling down’ to the subnational level (Snyder 2001a) this dissertation recognizes the 
uneven effects of such institutional characteristics within countries. Furthermore, we 
know very little about how corporatism actually affects citizen behaviors and attitudes. 
This reality is surprising given that for many governments throughout the world, these 
types of state-society structures were explicitly adopted to control the ways in which the 
masses interacted with and perceived the state. Finally, this study contributes to a 
relatively small but growing literature on the effects of institutions of the past and their 
continuing legacy and impact on modern day political processes and procedures. 
In this introductory chapter, I present the key concepts and methods that will be 
used throughout the remaining pages of this dissertation. First, I review the vast literature 
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that has emerged on the concept of corporatism throughout the past 40 years within Latin 
America and throughout the world. Second, I briefly discuss the analytical approaches I 
will use in my empirical analyses. In this section I will examine the benefits of using a 
subnational comparative analysis to understand the individual-level effects of 
corporatism and why this is preferable to more common national or cross-national 
approaches. Also in this section I will explain the empirical strategy to be used 
throughout the pages of this dissertation. This chapter concludes by presenting an 
organizational outline of the dissertation.  
 
The Study of Corporatism into the 21st Century 
 
Corporatism has long been of interest to those who study political institutions, 
both within Latin America and beyond. Although the contemporary meaning of this 
concept can be traced back to the papal encyclical Rerum Novarum published in 1891 by 
Pope Leo XIII2, it was not until the rise of dictator Benito Mussolini in fascist Italy that 
corporatism began to have relevance beyond academic and theological spheres. Indeed, 
in a resolution presented on 14 November 1933 to the Assembly of the National Council 
of Corporations, Mussolini defined corporations as “the instrument which, under the 
aegis of the State, carries out the complete organic and unitarian regulation of production 
with a view to the expansion of wealth, political power, and well-being of the Italian 
people” (Mussolini 1975, 9). With this, corporatism became a primary institutional 
                                                        
2 The Rerum Novarum was in response to the intense debates between socialist and capitalist forms of 
economic organization in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Pope Leo XIII put forward a corporatist 
framework as a possible solution to what was seen by the Church as two economic systems that were 
incompatible with the Catholic faith and social doctrine. For more information on the Catholic connection 
to corporatist development, see Morck and Yeung (2010).  
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arrangement in which citizens were organized within society. Furthermore, to participate 
politically and economically, the Italian citizenry was divided among relevant syndicates 
“formed for each category of workers, and […] called upon to examine all problems of 
interest to the category, to appoint syndicate leaders and to discuss the requirements of 
the workers” (ibid, 77). In short, the entire economic, social, and political lives of post-
World War I Italians flowed through syndicates or federations that corresponded to their 
profession, trade, or occupation. 
As the second wave of democratization receded and authoritarian governments 
took hold throughout the world (Huntington 1991), including Latin America, scholars 
began to note that these regimes were using the corporatist frameworks designed by 
Mussolini to organize, control, and, if needed, repress citizens. While scholars agreed on 
the general presence of corporatism in the region, they disagreed on the reasons behind it. 
One view, articulated by Howard Wiarda (1973) was that corporatism, while of course an 
institutional characteristic in the Americas was, more importantly, part of the social and 
cultural fabric of the region. “In comprehending the Iberic-Latin systems,” writes Wiarda, 
“one must think in terms of a hierarchically and vertically segmented structure of class 
and caste stratifications, of social rank order, functional corporations, estates, juridical 
groupings and interests— a rigid yet adaptable scheme whose component parts are tied to 
and drive legitimacy from the authority of the central state or its leader” (210-11; see also 
Wiarda 1974). This corporatist tradition, notably, extends beyond the shores of Latin 
America and into Eastern Europe, and Ukraine in particular (Kubicek 2000).  
Although the cultural approach to the study of corporatism has proven to be 
influential and long lasting, it has also been largely criticized. “Adoption of the 
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corporatist framework as the basic paradigm for the analysis of Latin American politics 
puts research in the area further outside the mainstream of more general developmental 
theory. Despite the claims for a unique tradition, political behavior in Latin America has 
much in common with that in other developing areas” (Hammergren 1977, 458). More 
recently, while reflecting on his career, Philippe Schmitter commented “I didn’t 
understand how anybody could possibly study corporatism without recognizing it was a 
state-imposed arrangement. I also disagreed with the notion of an overarching ‘Iberian’ 
political culture. I had had enough experience living in Mexico before I went to Brazil 
that I could immediately recognize that in cultural terms, Brazil was not Mexico” (Munck 
and Snyder 2007, 320). Schmitter completes this thought by stating unequivocally “It was 
clear to me that corporatism in Brazil had absolutely nothing to do with Brazilian 
political culture” (ibid). 
Schmitter, for his part, had an equally (if not more) influential role in the study of 
corporatism, particularly from the institutionalist perspective. Indeed, it is in his 1974 
article “Still the Century of Corporatism” where the contemporary meaning of the 
concept was first developed and defined.3 Furthermore, it was in this article where the 
distinction was made between state corporatism found in “political systems in which 
territorial subunits are tightly subordinated to central bureaucratic power” (Schmitter 
1974, 105) and the more democratically acceptable form, societal corporatism which is 
“the concomitant, if not ineluctable, component of the […] organized democratic welfare 
                                                        
3 Schmitter defines corporatism as “a system of interest representation in which the constituent units are 
organized into a limited number of singular, compulsory, noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered and 
functionally differentiated categories, recognized or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a 
deliberate representational monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for observing certain 
controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands and supports” (1974, 93-4).  
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state” (ibid)4 The former, argues Schmitter, is found most frequently in developing 
regions such as Latin America, while the latter is found primarily in Western Europe and 
to a lesser extent, the United States (Brand 1988).  
While Schmitter’s definition of corporatism is a valid and, at least in theory, 
testable one, in practice its 19 separate components quickly pose problems in terms of the 
operationalization of the concept.5 A more manageable definition, however, comes from 
Collier and Collier (1979; see also 1977) who write “one may define a system of state-
group relations as corporative to the degree that there is (1) state structuring of groups 
that produces a system of officially sanctioned, non-competitive, compulsory interest 
associations; (2) state subsidy of these groups; and (3) state imposed constraints on 
demand-making, leadership, and internal governance” (968). In the next chapter I use a 
modified version of this definition to argue that even though Colombia, as a country, can 
hardly be described as corporative (see Bailey 1977; Kline 2004), it is an ideal case in 
which to examine the subnational, individual-level effects of the phenomenon.  
It was not uncommon for scholars studying corporatism prior to the 1980s to link 
it with other prevailing concepts of the time. For example Malloy (1974; see also 1977) 
went so far as to make the case for the “potential utility of revising and enlarging the 
concept of corporatism as a specific subtype of development-oriented authoritarianism” 
                                                        
4 It is worth noting that Schmitter is not the only scholar to disaggregate corporatism; O’Donnell (1974), in 
the context of bureaucratic-authoritarianism distinguishes between “statizing” and “privatist” forms of 
corporatism while Lemburch (1979) defines the meaning of liberal corporatism.  
5 In the same interview with Gerardo Munck in 2002, while reflecting on professional regrets, Schmitter 
states “My second regret concerns how I conceptualized corporatism. I included a very large number of 
variables in my definition. That seems excessive now, and I think it was a mistake. It probably would have 
been better if I had not been so elaborate, if I had focused instead on a small number of dimensions, say, 
four or five, rather than the nineteen I have been told are there. This would have been an improvement from 
an operational standpoint. At the time, I thought I could use my elaborate definition in a narrative, 
descriptive, ‘ideal-typical’ way and that it would be self-evident whether, say, Austria, Finland, or the 
Netherlands was corporatist. But, later on, when I started to study corporatism quantitatively, I realized my 
definition was difficult to operationalize” (Munck and Snyder 2007, 334).  
  9
(84). Meanwhile, immediately following the implementation of the dual-transition,6 both 
scholars and journalists7 argued that corporatist institutions were not conducive with 
either democratic systems of governance or open-market economic systems and would, 
therefore, fade away into the region’s past: 
The potential of nonprogrammatic political parties to compete electorally  
and mediate interests via the traditional channels of corporatism and  
clientelism is also diminished by the reduction in the scope of state  
regulatory and distributive activity. Corporatist institutions that were put  
in place by state authorities in order to control the incipient mobilization  
of labor will, by design, be less effective mediations for more mature labor  
movements in open economies. The deregulation of labor markets and the  
restructuring of labor benefits, objectives on the agenda of every  
neoliberal reformer in Latin America, in fact have weakened corporatist  
unions and union-party alliances. (Hagopian 1998, 108). 
 
 In 1989, Schmitter noted corporatism’s “dynamic continuity punctuated by 
periodic demise and subsequent resurrection” (Schmitter 1989, 72) but also expressed his 
doubts that corporatism would ever again be considered a transformational concept in 
political science. “Especially when viewed from the macro- or national-level, it looks too 
small in scale to have much influence over transnational forces and too large in scale to 
be of much help in the restructuring of sectoral and regional patterns” (ibid). While 
perhaps not to the hyperbolic levels that it was considered to be almost 30 years ago 
when it was labeled as one of the great “-isms” of political science (Wiarda 1996), 
contemporary scholars of comparative politics have recognized the continued 
institutional presence of corporatism and its effects on modern-day politics and society. 
At least in the case of Latin America, scholars have recognized not only the continued 
existence and impact of corporatist institutions in the region, but also its evolving nature 
                                                        
6 For an overview of the dual transition in Latin America, see Encarnación (1996).  
7 In its 15 January 1998 edition, the Economist wrote “Yet almost a decade after the collapse of the Soviet 
empire and the near simultaneous exhaustion of Latin American old corporatism, the once powerful left is 
still struggling to develop a modern alternative to what it calls the ‘neo-liberalism’ of the reformers.” 
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in diverse areas throughout region including Venezuela (Corrales and Cisneros 1999), 
Argentina (Etchemendy and Collier 2007) and even subnational Mexico (Snyder 2001b).  
 The purpose of this section has not been to offer a complete review of state-
society relations or even corporatism, but rather to introduce the concept and place it 
within the field’s current debates. At least in Latin America, a primary motivation for 
corporatism was to affect, in expected ways, citizen behaviors and attitudes throughout 
the region. While the authoritarian regimes have since been replaced with electorally 
accountable, democratic governments, corporatism continues to be a relevant structural 
characteristic in many countries. Given the original intent of corporatism and the fact that 
it continues to exist in the 21st century, it is important to ask how it affects citizens’ 
perceptions of and interactions with their current governments and democratic systems.  
 In the next section, I outline the overarching analytical approach that will be used 
to examine the effects of 21st century corporatism on modern-day mass behaviors and 
attitudes. In addition to defending my decision to use a subnational approach to answer 
the questions posed in this study, I will also comment briefly on the methodological 
approach and econometric techniques to be used for the empirical analyses.  
 
A Subnational Approach to the Study of Corporatism 
 
 Undoubtedly, the vast majority of scholarly work on corporatism has been done 
from a national, or (to a lesser extent) cross-national approach (Malloy 1977; Collier and 
Collier 1979; Wiarda 2004). I take a different approach by using subnational comparative 
analysis in order to understand how corporatist structures affect mass behaviors and 
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attitudes. While there are most certainly costs associated with such an approach, I argue 
that the benefits far outweigh any of the disadvantages. Here, I briefly discuss my reasons 
for using a subnational strategy instead of a cross-national one and introduce the 
hierarchical modeling technique that I will use in later chapters. 
 
The Subnational Comparative Approach 
 Since the advent of contemporary social science after World War II, scholars have 
recognized the theoretical and empirical advantages to using subnational levels of 
analyses. “[I]nternation differences are not solely troublesome, but can be of great value 
in comparative sociological research and in the study of social change” (Linz and de 
Miguel 1966, 268). More contemporary scholarship, however, has expounded on the 
benefits expressed by Linz and de Miguel almost 50 years ago. Specifically, Snyder 
(2001a) notes the distinct advantages to using subnational units of analysis. First, a 
subnational focus can greatly increase the number of units under analysis. Instead of 
studying just one Colombia, a researcher can instead study 32 Colombian departments or 
1,100 Colombian municipalities. By doing this, scholars are able to use more robust, 
comparative analyses rather than the more limiting methodological options that are 
available when only examining one case. As will be describe in more detail in Chapter II, 
this particular study takes full advantage of this attribute; by scaling down to the 
municipal level with multiple survey years, this analysis quickly goes from an N of one to 
an N of over 300 distinct municipal years.  
 A second advantage afforded to those who take advantage of a subnational unit of 
analysis is that by focusing on such units, we are inherently “holding constant” factors 
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that naturally vary cross-nationally. “Subnational units within a single country can be 
more easily matched on cultural, historical, ecological, and socioeconomic dimensions 
than can national units” (Snyder 2001a, 96). Indeed, this point applies especially well to 
Colombia where not only am I controlling for “fuzzy” concepts such as culture, but 
because of its unitary nature and extreme uniformity across subnational units I also hold 
constant institutional characteristics such as government type or strength of political 
actors.   
 Another advantage discussed by Snyder is one that was originally put forward in 
Linz and de Miguel’s essay – the “inappropriate use of national averages.” Indeed, this 
too is of great importance for the Colombian case; it is national “averages” that have led 
scholars such as Bailey (1977), Kline (2004), and others to dismiss almost outright the 
corporatist realities in the country. Although at the national-level Colombia is clearly not 
“corporatist” in the same sense as Argentina, Brazil, or Mexico, once one digs down to 
the departmental, or even more strikingly, the municipal level, it becomes clear that 
corporatism is not an irrelevant or absent characteristic. 
 Of course one cannot deny that cross-national research approaches lend 
themselves more easily to issues of generalizability and external validity than do 
subnational comparative analyses; the motivation for cross-national research, argues 
Jackman (1985) is “to develop probabilistic generalizations about the causal relationships 
(or lack thereof) between variables” (166). Admittedly, by examining a single case 
subnationally, it is impossible to make concrete generalizations beyond Colombia and its 
Coffee Federation. However, that does not mean that this study lacks relevance beyond 
the Colombian case. Subnational comparative methodologies are especially useful in 
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“help[ing] us build theories that explain dynamic interactions among the levels and 
regions of a political system” (Snyder 2001a, 100). Indeed, as I will argue in the 
concluding chapter, this study has theoretical relevance for our understanding not only of 
how corporatism affects behaviors and attitudes inside and outside of Colombia, but also 
how institutions of the past continue to hold relevance in contemporary society; how best 
to go about systematically understanding how such institutions influence citizen 
behaviors and attitudes; and finally, how municipal contexts in Latin America and 
beyond shape democratic behaviors, attitudes and perceptions of the citizenry.  
 
A Note on the Statistical Approach 
 The empirical questions posed in this study are clearly of a hierarchical or multi-
level nature. I am interested in explaining the extent to which an ecological condition 
influences individual-level behaviors and attitudes. For decades, scholars have been 
interested in answering such questions; “People make political decisions and act 
politically as individuals who are embedded in political contexts that can affect their 
choices and behaviors. Thus the nature of democratic elections – even if elections are 
identical – can be influenced by the institutional context” (Dalton and Anderson 2011, 3). 
However, including variables at multiple levels of analysis into standard ordinary least 
squares or logistic regression models is problematic: “this procedure can heavily 
overstate system-level effects largely because they involve single data points that are then 
associated with […] individual cases” (Booth and Seligson 2009, 112). To remedy this 
problem, scholars, in recent years, have begun using modeling techniques specifically 
designed for hierarchically structured data such as the type I use in this dissertation. 
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 Designed originally for educational and pedagogical research,8 social scientists 
have begun applying hierarchical linear and non-linear models to some of the most 
vexing social questions of our day. In terms of understanding individual-level outcomes, 
this statistical technique explicitly recognizes that a number of different factors at a 
number of different levels influence how a person acts, feels, or behaves, “The use of 
hierarchical linear models […] allows incorporating the effects of national and municipal 
factors on individual outcomes, which in the absence of multilevel statistical techniques 
would be difficult to assess” (Montalvo 2011, 28). The idea that “institutions matter” in 
political decision-making and behavior is most definitely not a new idea; however, with 
hierarchical modeling, we are able to understand better the extent to how they matter. 
 Another benefit of hierarchical modeling techniques is that they allow researchers 
to make use of data in ways that would otherwise not be possible. Due to various 
resource constraints, scholars who have been interested in explaining mass behaviors and 
attitudes in Latin America most often relied on sampling a small number of cities 
(typically three) or, more recently, relying on survey representative at the national-level. 
Because the survey’s representative nature did not extend down to the subnational-level, 
even if a respondent’s state or municipality of residence was included in the dataset, it 
was impossible to compare with any degree of confidence individuals in different 
subnational units. Furthermore, for subnational scholars who were fortunate enough to 
construct subnational samples and carry out surveys, given scarcity of time, money, and 
other resources, they were almost always restricted to one, or at most, a few, subnational 
units, leading to the “too few cases/too many variables” conundrum (Goggin 1986; 
                                                        
8 For a more in-depth discussion of both the application of hierarchical models in pedagogy and the 
technical aspects of method, see Raudenbush and Byrk (2002).  
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Lijphart 1971) that is omnipresent in social science research. By using hierarchical 
modeling techniques, scholars can use (properly identified) national-level surveys to 
estimate subnational contextual effects on individual-level behaviors and attitudes. 
Additionally, although more observations or cases within a group are optimal, “Even two 
observations per group is enough to fit a multilevel model” (Gelman and Hill 2007, 276). 
In essence, by simultaneously estimating the effects both contextual- and individual-level 
variables on the dependent variable, scholars are able to “hold constant” individual-level 
factors while estimating the independent effects of the contextual co-variates on an 
individual-level dependent variable. 
 By using individual-level survey data on Colombia from the Latin American 
Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), this study takes advantage of both hierarchical linear 
and non-linear estimation techniques. In addition to the 49 municipalities included in the 
LAPOP dataset, I merge seven distinct rounds together for the analyses, increasing the 
number of level-2 groups to over 300 and largely eliminating any “degrees of freedom 
problem” that would have existed.  
 
Outline of Dissertation 
 
 The remaining pages of this dissertation are divided into four chapters. Chapter II 
begins with an in-depth look at the creation and consolidation of the Coffee Federation as 
an irreplaceable institutional actor in Colombian politics, economics, and society. Using 
the definition provided by Collier and Collier (1979), I examine the extent to which the 
Federation can be considered corporatist while also considering what previous 
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scholarship has said on the topic. The second part of Chapter II is devoted to the creation 
of a theoretically relevant and empirically practical typology to categorize Colombian 
municipalities regarding institutional presence within their jurisdiction. Following this 
discussion, I consider and put forth a plan about how best to measure quantitatively 
municipal context in Colombia. 
 Using the contextual data explained in Chapter II along with individual-level 
survey data provided by LAPOP, the third chapter of this dissertation examines how 
FNCC influence, conditional to that of the state, affects citizens’ trust in government and 
satisfaction with local services. In terms of trust in government, I consider measures for 
trust in municipal, departmental, and national government and find robust effects of 
FNCC presence on trust at all levels. Furthermore, citizens living in municipalities with 
either a strong state presence or a strong FNCC presence are, on average, most satisfied 
with the provision of local services.  
 Chapter IV focuses its attention on how citizens’ political behaviors are affected 
by living in a certain municipal context. Before turning to the empirical analyses, I 
review the precarious nature of political participation and behaviors throughout 
Colombia’s recent history. I also consider the role the Federation may have played during 
the consociational governance period in Colombian known as the National Front when 
the government explicitly tried to reduce the levels of partisanship among the populace 
and as a result, reduced levels of political participation. 
 Next, I consider how the FNCC in contemporary Colombia might affect how 
people participate politically, in both conventional and unconventional ways. Among the 
six modes of conventional political participation, I find that, in general, there is little 
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difference among the municipalities aside from working for a political campaign. For this, 
I find that citizens living in a municipality with a high Federation and low state presence 
are more likely to report having done so than citizens living in other types of 
municipalities.  
 In terms of unconventional political behavior, I examine participation in protests 
and support for the right of citizens to engage in peaceful public demonstrations. For the 
latter I find no statistically significant difference between the municipalities while for the 
former, I find that citizen living in municipalities with high FNCC presences are less 
likely to report having participated in a protest than Colombians living in municipalities 
with low Federation presences. Taken with the findings from the conventional behavior 
analyses, I argue that these results provide us with evidence of the continued, yet altered 
role of corporatism in 21st century Colombia.  
 In the concluding fifth chapter, after summarizing the findings of the analyses, I 
consider the implications not only for the Colombia and its National Coffee Federation, 
but throughout Latin America. In general, I contend that while corporatism might have 
been developed in a less than democratic era of the region, it is an institution that is here 
to stay and one whose influence must be recognized as fragile democracies in the region 
continue to consolidate. Also in this chapter I examine possible avenues for future 
research by examining ways in which scholars have demonstrated that institutions, 
especially those of a previous time period, affect how people interact with and perceive 
of their governments. Finally, I offer concluding thoughts on the future of the FNCC and 
its role within Colombian society.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
 
ON THE ORIGINS AND STRUCTURE OF THE NATIONAL FEDERATION OF 
COLOMBIAN COFFEE-GROWERS 
 
  
 
 In many ways, the terms Colombia and coffee are synonymous. Since the early 
part of the 20th century, Colombia has been a world leader in the cultivation and 
exportation of high quality, washed Arabica coffee to robust markets of the more 
developed countries in North America, Europe and even Asia. The success of Colombian 
coffee is, of course, no accident. Since the creation of the government-sponsored 
National Coffee Federation in 1927, the Colombian coffee industry has established one of 
the world’s best known and most respected brands; indeed, along with Ronald McDonald, 
the Energizer Bunny and the Doublemint Gum twins, the FNCC’s Juan Valdez is one of 
the most recognized corporate logos in the developed world (Reina et al. 2007). However, 
along with its status on the international stage, the Colombian Coffee Federation plays a 
less obvious but even more important role throughout hundreds of rural Colombian 
municipalities. The coffee industry, and especially the Federation, substantially affects 
the lives of millions of Colombian citizens and their daily routines. 
 This dissertation analyzes the extent to which the FNCC influences the political 
behaviors, attitudes and perceptions of those Colombians most affected by its presence—
namely those living in what I define as coffee municipalities. However, before an 
empirical assessment of this issue proceeds, it is crucial to offer an in-depth exploration 
of the origins and structure of the National Federation of Colombian Coffee-Growers and 
the trajectory of the coffee industry more broadly. While this chapter will mention briefly 
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the role of the FNCC in the international economic and diplomatic arenas, the main focus 
will be on the domestic development and impact of the Federation within the Colombian 
municipality and its influence on Colombian society. Following this discussion, I will 
link the general discussion on corporatism presented in Chapter I to the National Coffee 
Federation in Colombia. Next, I will develop and discuss a typology for which to 
measure Federation presence in a municipality conditional on state presence. This 
organizational schema will be used in the following chapters to test hypotheses regarding 
FNCC effects on behaviors and attitudes.  Finally, I will detail my strategy for measuring 
not only the presence of the FNCC within the Colombian municipality, but also the 
presence and strength of state institutions.   
 
The National Federation of Colombian Coffee-Growers, 1927-present 
 
 Following the introduction of coffee into Colombia in the first half of the 18th 
century by Jesuit priests,1 cultivation of the crop grew steadily until it became a 
significant contributor to the country’s productivity in the mid 19th century (Machado 
1994; Junguito and Pizano 1991; Pizano 2001). Indeed, in 1880, Colombia exported 
about 107,000 60-kilo bags of coffee; however, by 1905 that number had skyrocketed to 
over 500,000 (Beyer 1947, 114-15). Similarly, in terms of total Colombian exports, 
coffee represented 12% in 1880 and 42% in 1905 (ibid). However, like most facets of 
Colombian economy and society, the coffee industry was left decimated following the 
Thousand Days’ War, the civil war that ravaged the country between 1899 and 1902. 
                                                        
1 Although scholars conventionally attribute the arrival of coffee to Colombia to Jesuit clergymen, 
historians and anthropologists have not concluded definitively that this was indeed the original source of 
the coffee plant to mainland South America.  
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Given Colombia’s need to reestablish foreign trade and to reignite economic activity it 
was quickly decided that “coffee should play a role of extreme importance commensurate 
with its already established position as the leading export” (Beyer 1947, 177). Indeed, in 
1910 Colombia accounted for about 3% of worldwide coffee exports but by 1930 that 
percentage had risen to over 10%; this paled in comparison to the worldwide leader, 
Brazil, which in 1930 was responsible for just under 70% of global coffee exports 
(Junguito and Pizano 1991, 25). Finally, as Colombia continued to become a world leader 
in coffee cultivation and export, it began to attract the attention of American and 
European importers and roasters who were eventually seen within the country as 
attempting to gain undue influence within the prospering Colombian coffee industry 
(Koffman 1969, 78). 
 It was in this economic and international climate that Colombian elites decided 
that there should be, in the words of Robert Bates (1997), “a permanent defense of coffee.” 
“The key to unraveling this anomaly lies in recognizing that politicians, not peasants 
organized the Federación” (Bates 1997, 60). However, the actual establishment of such 
an organization proved to be much more elusive than many had anticipated. In 1920 the 
Sociedad de Agricultores de Colombia (SAC) organized the first ever Coffee Congress in 
Colombia to respond to the devastating effects of the First World War on global coffee 
prices. While many attended and a number of measures were agreed upon, the results of 
this two-week conference were all but forgotten just a couple of years later.    
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The Permanent Establishment of the Federación Nacional de Cafeteros de Colombia 
 In 1927, a group of 29 government representatives, businessmen and industry 
leaders convened in Medellín, Colombia for the Second Coffee Congress where they 
formed the Federación Nacional de Cafeteros de Colombia. Equally important to the 
eventual success of this new organization was the explicit support that it received from 
the national government, most notably through the passage of Law 26 of 1927 that 
permitted “the government of Colombia [to] impose an export tax on coffee, the proceeds 
of which were granted to the FNC(C)” (Bates 1997, 61). As a result of this corporatist 
arrangement, in 1928, the national government and the Coffee Federation entered into a 
binding contract that clarified the roles and responsibilities of both parties: 
The Federation was to: 1) Promote an active scientific program in the 
interest of Colombian coffee to be developed on its own initiative; 2) take 
the necessary measures for the establishment of the best methods of 
cultivation; 3) establish storage warehouses in the interest of the coffee 
industry, the profits were to be used by the FNCC as a supplementary 
source of income; 4) send missions of experts abroad to conduct studies in 
the interest of the coffee industry; 5) establish roasting houses for 
Colombian coffee both abroad and at home; 6) publish a monthly 
magazine; 7) develop statistical services; 8) direct the flow of coffee 
toward the markets it conceives most appropriate. (Beyer 1947, 237).  
 
The government, for its part, “maintained the right of financial review of the Federation’s 
activities and investments, with the sanction of fine or cancellation of the contract for any 
infraction of the agreement” (ibid, 237-38). 
 It took relatively little time for the FNCC to make its presence felt within the 
commercial and research sectors of the coffee industry. Indeed, within just ten years of 
the Federation’s founding, the organization had established what would become a world-
  22
class research center2 as well as the establishment of international missions in cities such 
as New York and Paris devoted solely to the promotion of Colombian coffee interests on 
the international stage. Perhaps the most significant achievement of the FNCC in terms of 
international prestige and influence was the leadership role it took (along with the 
Brazilian coffee industry) in the organization of various international coffee institutions 
(Bates 1997; Akiyama and Varangis 1990). Other commercial achievements by the 
FNCC included its controlling share of the international maritime shipping company 
Flota Mercante Grancolombiana (Martinez Becerra 1988) as well as the establishment of 
its own commercial bank, el Banco Cafetero.3 
 Although the commercial dealings of the Federation took little time to establish, 
the grassroots and membership issues proved to be more complicated. Following the 
Second Coffee Congress, “The most crucial immediate problem (as seen by the national 
committee) was financial” (Koffman 1969, 81). While most of those who led the FNCC 
saw as the solution to this particular problem the imposition of dues on its membership, 
Alfredo Cortázar Toledo, a government representative to the Congress, was not one of 
them: “This formula was absolutely inoperative: membership dues and private donations 
were a resource that one could not pose seriously, and the appropriations of Congress, the 
Assemblies or the Municipal Council were, even if sometimes real, a thing so small and 
so unstable that no important body, such as was intended, could be created on such a 
basis” (Cortázar 1968, 49). Cortázar convinced industry leaders and government officials 
that not only would membership dues be an unreliable source of income, but that it would 
                                                        
2 One New York Times reporter labeled Cenicafé, the FNCC’s research center as the “NASA of coffee.” 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/10/science/earth/10coffee.html?pagewanted=all 
3 Following the collapse of the International Coffee Agreement and the beginning of the Coffee Crisis in 
1989, both of these commercial endeavors were abandoned.  
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have a devastating effect on enrollment and therefore the overall legitimacy of the new 
organization (Koffman 1969). It was decided instead that an export tax administered by 
the government and deposited in the Federation controlled Fondo Nacional de Café 
would be a more sustainable and realistic alternative. 
 
The Federal Nature of the Coffee Federation 
As its name would suggest, the National Federation of Colombian Coffee 
Growers is structured in a federated manner. Along with the national organization, the 
Federation also has 15 departmental committees (departments are the equivalents of 
states in the U.S.),4 which is the core of the subnational structure, and within those 
departmental units, 364 municipal committees, spread throughout the country (FNCC 
2011).  Furthermore, members of the Federation elect municipal representatives who in 
turn elect representatives from among their ranks for seats in the National Coffee 
Congress. Among their more substantive duties, members of the National Coffee 
Congress are responsible for approving nominations for the Director-General sent to 
them by the National Committee and approving the national budget and strategic plan as 
sent to them by the National Committee (FNCC 2004). Municipal representatives serve 
mainly to bring forth constituent grievances and concerns before the departmental 
committees while also advising the Federation’s administrative representative within the 
municipality.5  
 Parallel to the representative structure of FEDECAFE exists the administrative 
arm of the organization led by the national Director-General based in Bogotá. This 
                                                        
4 32 departments and one federal district (Bogotá) make up Colombia. 
5 Interview with the jefe seccional of the Municipal Committee of Dosquebradas, Risaralda, 23 June 2009. 
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position has only seen a handful of occupants in its 80-year history and many have 
argued that the Director-General’s power and influence rivals that of the president in the 
sphere of domestic politics and economics.  A similar position exists at the department 
level, thus in effect there are 15 “governor-like” positions around the country. At the 
local level, departmental committees assign a jefe seccional to oversee administrative 
functions, staffing and budgetary allocation decisions. Since those positions are not 
elected, the corporate, top-down structure is obvious. 
 A final structural aspect worthy of note is membership requirements within the 
Federation. Although some have stated that membership in FEDECAFE is open to “any 
person interested in developing the coffee industry” (Kline 2004, 188), the reality is 
somewhat more complicated.6 Referring to the Federation’s current statutes, an individual 
is eligible to associate with the organization if (1) he or she devotes at least 0.5 hectares 
of land to the production of coffee and (2) has at least 1,500 coffee plants. Although it is 
only land owners who are eligible to become members of the Coffee Federation, 
FEDECAFE prides itself on delivering services to entire municipalities, whether the 
individual is a member of the organization or not.7  
However, while the Federation emphasizes its inclusiveness in social, educational 
and health programs, it also has a history of ignoring or impeding the organizational 
efforts of coffee laborers and day workers, “The FNCC’s silence… about work 
conditions on many farms makes it impossible to determine the organization’s role in 
curtailing actions that could have empowered laborers to bargain more freely for wage 
                                                        
6 In the original statutes, eligibility was open to anybody who was simply interested in developing the 
coffee industry; the statutes, however, underwent major alterations in 1958. For a review of the changes 
made during this time, see Koffman (1969) 
7 See Chapter I, Article 4 of the Federation’s Statutes (FNCC 2004).  
  25
and working conditions” (Ortiz 1999, 52). Today, the FNCC estimates that over 2 million 
Colombians are either directly or indirectly employed within the coffee sector of the 
national economy. However, only those who own land and devote sufficient amounts of 
it to the cultivation of coffee are invited to participate and receive full benefits from the 
organization. What’s more, evidence suggests that the Federation has either neglected or 
outright hampered efforts of those who are shut out of the association to successfully and 
meaningfully organize themselves.   
 Finally, for a municipality to be designated a ‘coffee municipality’ by 
FEDECAFE, that municipality must have at least 400 Federation-associated coffee 
farmers “whose annual production is equal or superior to 60,000 arrobas8 a year” (FNCC 
2004, 46) and must be part of a department with a departmental committee. Of the 
roughly 1,100 municipalities in Colombia, 364 currently have municipal committees 
(FNCC 2010).9 With one-third of the municipalities within Colombia being designated 
coffee municipalities I will be able to evaluate systematically the differences between 
coffee and non-coffee municipalities.  
 Ortiz argues that “Although farmers regard the high echelons as a distant 
bureaucracy, they are well aware of their dependence on many of the services the FNCC 
offers. Its presence in the major producing areas is very real. Municipal committees keep 
track of all affiliated farmers, the size of their farms, how they use their land, and the 
coffee groves” (Ortiz 1999, 50). In addition, it is at the municipal level where most of the 
social, educational and health initiatives are undertaken. Given this reality of the 
                                                        
8 One arroba of coffee is approximately 25 U.S. pounds.  
9For an overview of the structural organization of the FNCC, see: “Organos Gremiales de la Federación de 
Cafeteros,” 
http://www.federaciondecafeteros.org/particulares/es/que_hacemos/representacion_gremial/organos_gremi
ales_de_la_federacion_de_cafeteros/ (accessed 13 February 2013). 
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Federation’s structure, this research will examine the effects of the association on 
individuals nested within distinct municipal contexts—some characterized by an 
overwhelming Federation presence and others where the Federation’s presence is 
considerably weaker or nonexistent.  
 
Federation Activities in Municipalities 
Since its beginning, the FNCC has had a notable presence within municipalities 
throughout Colombia’s primary coffee growing regions. Indeed, just two years after its 
founding in 1927, the Federation established an agricultural extension program which 
employs agronomists and engineers to provide technical assistance to federated coffee-
growers (Reina et al. 2007). Through this program, farmers meet at least once a year, and 
often times more with Federation extensionistas.10 Although farmers and managers 
(agregados) are not required to accept or implement any of the advice or guidance of the 
extensionistas, FNCC personnel are generally well-regarded and perceived to be working 
in the interest of the coffee grower. Indeed, the Federation attributes its overwhelming 
success in the modernization of the Colombian coffee crop to the well-organized and 
well-regarded extension service that is present throughout the Colombian countryside.11 
 While the Federation’s extension service is of vital importance not only to the 
macro success of the Colombian coffee industry, but also to those caficultores who 
receive the benefit, in terms of municipal impact, this service is relatively insignificant. In 
                                                        
10 Interview with the jefe seccional of the Municipal Committee of Dosquebradas, Risaralda, 23 June 2009. 
11 The modernization (tecnificación) of coffee farms involves farmers adopting methods and practices that 
in the long term and aggregate increase crop productivity. The initial cost of modernizing a coffee farm can 
be substantial; farmers must upgrade their coffee plants. Additionally, in order to remain ‘modernized’ 
farmers must engage in a practice known as ‘zoca’ where coffee plants are cut off at the base of their stem 
and allowed to regrow. It can take anywhere from 18-24 months for a plant to produce coffee beans after 
this process. The FNCC recommends that at any given time, 20% of a coffee farm undergo this renovation 
process. For more information regarding these technical aspects, see Guhl (2004) 
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order to receive this service, one not only has to produce his or her own coffee crop, but 
must also formally associate with the Coffee Federation. However, of greater 
consequence to municipal governance and perception, I argue, are the Federation’s 
activities in social welfare as well as infrastructural projects within the localities where it 
has an official presence. Although the FNCC always had a strong mandate and indeed 
was contractually obligated to assist in the social welfare and infrastructure of those 
municipalities in which it had a presence, these activities did not become a primary focus 
of Federation operations in municipalities until the mid-1960s. Since assuming these 
duties, the FNCC has been credited with constructing hundreds of schools, hospitals and 
clinics, thousands of houses and bringing potable water to hundreds of rural 
municipalities. Furthermore, the Coffee Federation routinely provides comprehensive 
health, dental and eye care to residents of coffee municipalities and subsidizes essential 
items such as fertilizers and de-pulpers to prepare coffee for the market.  
 
    Figure II.1. Jefe Seccional (left) and extensionista (center) visiting a local coffee farmer at  
    his finca in Dosquebradas, Risaralda, Colombia (photo credit: author). 
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The Federation’s heavy involvement in social welfare and infrastructural matters 
has not gone unnoticed by scholars. Since the 1980s studies examining the role of the 
FNCC have equated it to a government bureaucracy or even an independent 
governmental structure. Palacios (1980), in his seminal work on the Colombian coffee 
industry, compares the FNCC to the national agricultural ministry. “As a bureaucracy,” 
he writes, “the FNCC seems to be more efficient than other organizations carrying out 
parallel functions such as the Ministry of Agriculture” (217). More significantly, perhaps, 
noted Colombian economist Miguel Urrutia (1983, 117) describes the Coffee Federation 
as being a “parallel state” and anthropologists Jeffery Bentley and Peter Baker (2000) 
write “In many ways therefore, the Federation operates as a kind of competent, 
alternative government in the Colombian Coffee Belt, where little corruption is evident. 
This is remarkable given that nearly one-third of the Colombian population lives within 
the Central Coffee Belt” (Bentley and Baker 2000, 6). 
 
Figure II.2. Road sign in Pereira, Risaralda, Colombia showing agencies contributing  
to public works projects. In addition to local government offices, the FNCC (left) is  
also represented (photo credit: author). 
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Although the Federation has largely been praised both at home and abroad for its 
efficient and effective management of social projects and infrastructural development in 
rural Colombian municipalities, it has not escaped criticism entirely. A primary reproach 
against the FNCC is that it is concerned with the social and economic fortune of the 
country’s peasantry insomuch as it corresponds to the organization’s commercial interests. 
In order to ensure the advancement of such interests, the FNCC, according to sociologist 
Christopher London (1999), has implemented a two-prong strategy based on productivity 
and paternalism. Through its research activities, extension service and its highly 
successful modernization campaign beginning in the 1970s and continuing into present-
day, the Federation has achieved increased and reliable productivity of high-quality, 
exportable Arabica coffee. Regarding the second focus, London writes, “Thanks to the 
construction of paternalistic relations, FEDECAFE has been able to cultivate the 
necessary moral authority to ensure that their productivity dictates are obeyed” (London 
1999, 108). London goes on to argue that this paternalistic mentality has been developed 
over the years and is sustained by coffee municipality residents’ complete reliance on the 
FNCC for both technical as well as social assistance. “The family farm is perceived to be 
unable, either materially or mentally, to survive unassisted in today’s economy” (London 
1997, 289). This dependence, however, is not felt toward government institutions, as it is 
perceived in these communities that the government has largely failed in its responsibility 
to provide for and ensure the well being of the residents.  
 Indisputably, since the collapse in 1989 of the International Coffee Agreement’s 
export quotas and the initiation of what has essentially become an unregulated world 
market for coffee, the economic and financial situation of the FNCC and the Colombian 
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coffee sector more generally has declined dramatically (Rincón García 2005).12 Since that 
time, the FNCC has had to implement severe austerity measures that have cut spending 
not only on marketing and other commercial expenses, but also on the services and 
assistance provided at the municipal level, leading it to rely on the financial support of 
the national government. However, even with these drastic cuts, between 2006 and 2010, 
the Federation reported having constructed or improved almost 2,000 water systems, 
2,300 classrooms, 62,000 kilometers of roadway, 300 hospitals and over 30,000 single 
family homes throughout Colombia’s countryside (FNCC 2011). Additionally, the 
Federation has been credited with supplying over 95% of the population in the rural 
coffee region with reliable and affordable electricity. Finally, while direct investment into 
social services by the Federation has, in real terms declined in recent years, the 
government has increasingly relied on the FNCC and its high levels of legitimacy to 
administer public funds throughout the country’s coffee municipalities (Arango Gaviria 
2000). 
 In short, although the macro influence of the Federation has undoubtedly declined 
since the first days of the ‘coffee crisis’, the institutional presence of the FNCC in 
Colombian municipalities is still very real and its everyday impact on citizens who live in 
those municipalities should not be underestimated. The challenge in the pages below is 
construct a measure to assess the influence of the FNCC throughout a wide cross-section 
of Colombian municipalities and estimate the degree to which this influence affects how 
citizens perceive, assess and behave within the political and democratic worlds of 
Colombia. 
                                                        
12 For a comprehensive review of the international politics of coffee and how it affects (and has been 
affected by) Colombia, see Bates (1997) and Junguito and Pizano (1993).  
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Conflicts, Disagreements, and Differences 
 Undoubtedly, the Coffee Federation and the Colombian national government have 
a very close and intertwined relationship. After all, government ministers hold a veto 
proof majority on the organization’s governing board and two interior ministry officials 
are assigned to the FNCC headquarters to protect government interests in the coffee 
sector. Both of these officials receive salaries equivalent to that of the Federation’s 
Director-General.13 The direct involvement of the government within the coffee sector 
has caused concern within international organizations and among scholars,  
It has been noted that the government’s role and participation in setting 
internal prices and coffee tax were occasionally influenced by 
macroeconomic policy goals and political priorities rather than the direct 
benefit of coffee growers. Naturally, this raises the question of what is the 
appropriate level of government intervention. The sector’s social, 
economic, and cultural importance in rural areas argues for the 
government’s close participation. However, when compared to other 
sectors, the current level of direct influence could be considered excessive. 
(Giovannucci 2003, 546). 
 
This close relationship has also caused a fair amount of conflict and disagreement 
between the institutions throughout the years. Indeed, even before the ink had dried on 
the original agreement between the two parties in the late 1920s, disagreements already 
existed. Many of these disputes have centered on issues of taxation, foreign exchange 
rates and the devaluation of the Colombian peso.14 However, in more recent years, more 
politically charged and controversial disagreements have emerged. For example, 
following the resignation in 2009 of Gabriel Silva Luján as Director-General of the 
FNCC to become Colombia’s Minister of Defense, President Álvaro Uribe’s 
                                                        
13 Oscar Arango Gaviria (Professor of Sociology, Universidad Tecnológica de Pereira and Director of 
Regional Development, Red Alma Mater) in discussion with the author, July 2011.  
14 See: Koffman 1969 (ch.6) and Bates 1997. 
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administration was accused of inappropriately supporting the candidacy of Luis Genaro 
Muñoz over the industry preferred Juan Camilo Restrepo.15, 16 In the end, the 
government’s preference won out and Luis Genaro currently serves as the Federation’s 
Director-General while Juan Camilo served in the administration of Juan Manuel Santos 
until 2013 and Gabriel Silva is Colombia’s ambassador to the United States. 
 In order to advance its own interests, the FNCC has often found itself at odds with 
a number of influential groups within Colombian society. Perhaps most expected would 
be the frustrations expressed by private coffee exporters regarding the fact that the 
Federation serves as both their largest competitor as well as the state-approved regulator 
of the product. Given that coffee exported with the ‘100% Colombian Coffee’ logo 
receives a premium on the world market because of its recognized consistent quality over 
coffee from other producing countries, private exporters recognize the need for and 
welcome a competent and efficient regulator.17 In his essay on policy recommendations 
for the Colombian coffee industry in the 21st century, Daniele Giovannucci (2003) writes, 
“The [FNCC’s] dual role as regulator and market participant should be carefully 
considered. Some functions could potentially be transferred to other agents, such as 
cooperatives, associations, or private firms, wherever appropriate, without sacrificing 
Colombia’s ability to negotiate in an ever-concentrating market” (547).  
 More surprising, however, are the conflicts with groups and interests with which 
the FNCC is considered to be allied, even groups within the Federation itself. For 
example, throughout the latter half of the twentieth century, the Coffee Federation has 
                                                        
15 20 August 2009. “Juan Camilo Restrepo renunció a terna para Gerente de Federación de Cafeteros.” El 
Tiempo. http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/CMS-5903233 (accessed 13 February 2013). 
16 Interview with former member of National Committee of Coffee-Growers, 18 June 2011. 
17 Interview with owner of a private coffee exporting company, 25 June 2009.  
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had to contend with various levels of opposition and discontent from departmental and 
municipal committees. Since the 1960s, the Departmental Committee of Caldas has been 
known as being especially opposed to many of the policies coming out of the 
Federation’s headquarters in Bogotá. Under the leadership of Pedro Uribe in the 1960s, 
the Departmental Committee of Caldas, along with those of Risaralda and Quindío 
“share[d] a common opposition to the proposal formulated at the national level to 
diversify agricultural production in their departments and reduce coffee output” 
(Koffman, 1969, 195). The subnational entities have also been long concerned with what 
they perceive as unfunded mandates from the central office as well as unfair distribution 
of resources from the national level to the various committees. In fact, in 1957, the entire 
Municipal Committee of Pereira “resigned in protest because nine out of ten delegates to 
the coffee congress came from Manizales and none from Pereira” (El Tiempo, cited in 
Koffman 1969, 196). A central issue leading to the breakup of the department of Caldas 
into three separate departments (Caldas, Quindío and Risaralda) was, among other factors, 
conflict between coffee-growers and the Departmental Committee in Caldas.18 
 Although a major source of legitimacy comes from the idea that the FNCC 
represents the interests of Colombian coffee-growers, it has been argued that the FNCC 
“may […] work in a vacuum, claiming to speak for the many small coffee producers 
without any real knowledge of what they [coffee-growers] really want or think or how 
they regard the men who claim to represent them” (Koffman 1969, 195). While since the 
time that Koffman conducted his study, the Federation has, mainly through surveys, 
come to understand small and medium sized coffee-growers better, there have still been 
periods of acrimony between the FNCC and those Colombians whom it claims to 
                                                        
18 See: Arango Gaviria and Rodriguez Rodriguez (1994). 
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represent. An example of this from contemporary history comes from the mid-1990s 
when the left-leaning Unidad Cafetera organized a number of work stoppages and strikes 
in the coffee region to protest severe cuts in programs and services to coffee farmers and 
laborers.  
  
The FNCC Through a Corporatist Lens 
 Forty years ago, scholars such as Robert Erikson and James Malloy argued 
persuasively that governments throughout Latin America use corporatism as a buffer 
between themselves and the masses. In exchange for government subsidies, monopolistic 
status, and other benefits bestowed upon them by national leaders, corporations were 
responsible for maintaining order among those they represented and for suppressing and 
discouraging activities by the masses that were considered to be undesirable for or 
inconvenient to governments or government actors. Finally, corporations were tasked 
with providing many of the goods and services to citizens that would normally fall under 
the purview of local, regional, or national governments. Although corporatist scholars of 
the 1970s and 80s theorized on the impact of corporatism on mass political behaviors and 
attitudes they were unable to examine their arguments empirically because of strict 
limitations placed on social science research by the region’s authoritarian governments. 
 Of course, since these arguments were developed, much has changed in Latin 
America. Most significantly has been the dual transition that swept through the region in 
the 1980s and 90s leaving in its wake the foundations for procedural democracy and 
open-market economic systems. As these profound changes settled throughout the 
hemisphere, there were those who argued that corporatism was compatible with neither 
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democracy, nor with the neo-liberal economies that had quickly become standard 
throughout the developing world. For those who did not necessarily express the demise of 
corporatist institutions, interest in the subject all but died and scholars who were once 
prolific in corporatist scholarship now focused their attention on more timely topics such 
as transitions, democratization, and development.  
 In the 30 years that have passed since the third wave of democratization crashed 
upon the shores of Latin America, scholars have noticed that corporatism continues to 
play an influential role on state-society relations throughout the continent. Less 
understood, however, is the effect such institutions have on contemporary mass behaviors 
and attitudes; after all, the extent to which we understand how corporatism affects the 
masses begins and ends with the hypotheses generated by scholars in the 1970s and 80s. 
However probable these hypotheses were at their time of creation, it is unreasonable to 
expect that in an era of ever-deepening procedural democracy and open-market economic 
systems, that corporatism and corporations continue to affect citizens in an identical 
fashion as that described by Malloy, Erikson, Schmitter, and others. The question that 
evolves from this discussion is how (if at all) in 21st century Latin America does 
corporatism influence how citizens behave within the political system and the attitudes 
they hold toward their respective governments?  
 Corporatism has not only evolved to remain relevant in the ever-changing context 
that is Latin America, but has done so in a way that continues to serve effectively the 
interests of governments that are now dependent on citizen input and participation. 
However these same governments still seek to limit such behaviors as necessary while 
also maximizing legitimacy and trust wherever possible. 
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 Colombia’s National Coffee Federation serves as an ideal case to examine the 
effects of corporatism on contemporary behaviors and attitudes. In addition to the general 
advantages of subnational analyses articulated by Linz and de Miguel (1968) and Snyder 
(2001b), the Coffee Federation is organized in a federated manner with the lowest-level 
being the municipality. Because of this, I am able to obtain a measurement of Federation 
presence at the municipal-level in addition to a state-presence measure that will, in turn, 
allow me to calculate the presence of the FNCC relative to that of the state for a given 
municipality. Rather than analyze the effects of Coffee Federation from the national-level, 
here I scale down to examine how this institution affects mass behaviors and attitudes at 
the municipal-level. However, given that the Federation does not operate in a vacuum, 
but in a dynamic political and social environment which includes the presence of the state, 
I categorize the municipalities into four groups: High State/Low Federation (HS/LF); 
Low State/High Federation (LS/HF); High State/High Federation (HS/HF); and Low 
State/Low Federation (LS/LF).19 These groups represent the presence of the two 
institutions in a given municipality. In HS/LF municipalities, the state has a high 
presence while the Federation has either a non-existent or insignificant presence in the 
municipality. Alternatively in LS/HF municipalities, the Federation is the strong 
institutional actor while the state is considered to be weak. In the HS/HF municipalities 
both actors are considered to have strong presences while in LS/LF municipalities both 
are considered to be weak or non-existent.   
 
  
                                                        
19 The use of typologies in comparative politics, and political science more generally, has often been 
criticized as lack theoretical depth and analytic rigor. For a defense of the use of categories, see Collier et al. 
(2009; 2012). 
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 The primary argument throughout this project is that as the Coffee Federation’s 
influence in a municipality increases relative to state presence, the FNCC will function as 
an “alternative government” or a “state within a state.” Therefore, in municipalities where 
the FNCC has a high presence and the state a low one, the FNCC will act in a more 
traditional corporatist role, although one that has evolved to function within the 
constraints of a 21st century electoral democracy and in spite of open-market economic 
institutions. More specifically, instead of “funneling” citizens away from political life, 
the FNCC in Low State/High Federation municipalities will work on behalf of the state, 
lending it legitimacy in the eyes of residents while also encouraging citizens to 
participate in conventional political activities that are requisite for any democratic society. 
However, consistent with corporatist institutions of the past, the FNCC will discourage 
residents from partaking in unconventional behaviors or activities that may be viewed as 
a nuisance by government.  
If the Coffee Federation is, as I argue above, essentially replacing the state as a 
competent provider of public goods and services in these municipalities, then we would 
also expect that when compared to municipalities considered to have a high state 
presence and a low (or no) Federation presence, the estimated individual-level outcomes 
would be roughly equal. Similarly, by serving as an alternative government in 
municipalities with a low state presence, it is logical to expect that attitudes toward the 
government and participation within it would be higher than in Low State/Low 
Federation municipalities where neither the Federation nor the state has a significant 
presence.  
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The expectations for outcomes in municipalities with low state and high 
Federation presences and low state and low FNCC presences is of particular importance. 
The only (observable) difference between these two types of municipalities is the 
significant presence of the FNCC in one and the insignificant (or non-existent) presence 
in the other. If the Federation is acting in a manner consistent with 21st century 
corporatism, there should be clear differences between these two types of municipalities.  
After all, if the Federation were not present in the Low State/High Federation 
municipality, then that municipality would naturally revert to being a Low State/Low 
Federation municipality and would assume the related municipal characteristics. 
Therefore, if, as is hypothesized, Colombians in Low State/High Federation 
municipalities hold more “pro-government” views and participate at higher levels in 
conventional political behaviors than residents in Low State/Low Federation 
municipalities, these differences can be attributed to the presence of the Federation in the 
locale. As a result, the government is benefitting from the FNCC’s presence in those 
municipalities; as the Federation provides competent and quality services the government 
emerges victorious.  
 The notion that in a democratic society a corporation would serve to both replace 
the presence of the state while at the same time lending the state legitimacy is not one 
that strays too far from conventional corporatist theory. However, what is less clear is 
how corporations would affect both trust in government and political participation among 
citizens living in areas where both the corporation and the state have relatively strong 
presences. In the case of the Colombian municipalities and the FNCC this scenario would 
occur in municipalities considered to be High State/High Federation.  
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 In this type of municipality, it is presumed that given the high presence of the 
state, it would be state institutions that would assume primary responsibility for the 
provision of basic services to the citizenry. Therefore, instead of acting as an ‘alternative 
government’ and replacing the state, the Federation behaves as a typical non-
governmental or civil society organization focusing primarily on its mission of assisting 
federated coffee farmers. However, this is not to say that there is no cooperation or 
interaction between the state and the FNCC in these municipalities; indeed, the two often 
times work closely together in a complementary relationship. In certain instances it is 
beneficial for governments to rely on others to carry out public services; in the United 
State, Young (2000) explains that in some cases non-profit organizations have an 
information advantage over government actors.  
Government may choose to contract out not only because it is cheaper but  
also because it may be unable to differentiate its services in response to  
the heterogeneous preferences of its citizens. There would be too much  
information to gather to do so. However, by contracting with nonprofits  
that are knowledgeable about the individual communities in which they  
are based, government can overcome the information problem and, within  
limits, allow those delivery agents to customize services to local  
constituents. (Young 2000, 154) 
  
 Although the FNCC is not a typical non-profit organization, there is no doubt that 
the relationship described above would apply to many interactions between governments 
in Colombia and the Federation. An apt example of the cooperation between 
governments and the FNCC occurred following the January 1999 earthquake that 
devastated parts of the country whose primary economic activity is coffee. Although the 
governments financed much of the reconstruction that took place, it was the FNCC, along 
with its departmental and municipal committees that were tasked with carrying out the 
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work of rebuilding. Outside of non-critical times such as disaster relief, the FNCC and 
state institutions work hand-in-hand in many municipalities through what has become 
known as bi-gobernación where both the government and the FNCC contribute 
financially to public works project and the FNCC implements the project from start to 
finish. 
 In municipalities where the state is a strong and effective actor and the FNCC 
works to complement state presence in many respects, the effect this relationship has on 
mass-behaviors and attitudes should be a positive one. In these types of municipalities, 
citizens are experiencing the best of both worlds, a strong and competent state and a well-
organized and active civil society organization. For this reason, I anticipate that citizens 
in municipalities with high state and high Federation presences will be most satisfied 
with government services in their municipalities. However, an important distinction 
between the this type of municipality and municipalities where the FNCC has a strong 
presence but the state has a weak one, is that here the Federation is not serving in a 
substituting role and therefore the corporatist component of the FNCC is muted 
substantially. Since corporations in democratic societies are expected to promote 
conventional political behaviors among citizens while discouraging unconventional 
behaviors, in HS/HF municipalities, I expect citizen participation in conventional 
political activities to be lower than in LS/HF municipalities but participation in 
unconventional behaviors to be higher.  
 The central thesis of this project is that while corporatism continues to matter in 
post-third wave Latin America, its effect is conditional on the strength of the presence of 
the state. Indeed, in the case of contemporary subnational Colombia, the FNCC’s effect 
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on mass behaviors and attitudes should vary systematically according to the degree to 
which it has replaced the state in a given municipality. Table II.1 below summarizes the 
expected outcomes of citizens’ political behaviors, attitudes and perceptions based on the 
conditional relationship between the Federation and the state in a municipality. 
Municipality Type  Expectations 
 
Trust in Government 
and Satisfaction with 
Services 
Conventional 
Political Behaviors 
Unconventional 
Political Behaviors 
   
High State/Low 
Federation 
Comparatively High 
Levels 
Lower Likelihood of 
Participation than 
LS/HF, but Higher 
than LS/LF 
Comparatively High 
Likelihood of 
Participation 
Low State/High 
Federation 
Comparatively High 
Levels, Significantly 
Higher than LS/LF 
Municipalities 
Highest Probability 
of Participation, 
Significant Higher 
than LS/LF 
Municipalities 
Lowest Likelihood of 
Participation, 
Significantly lower 
than LS/LF 
High State/High 
Federation  Highest Levels 
High Probability of 
Participation 
Low Likelihood of 
Participation 
Low State/Low 
Federation 
Comparative Low 
Levels, Significantly 
Lower than LS/HF 
municipalities 
Lowest Levels, 
Significantly Lower 
than LS/HF 
Municipalities 
Comparatively High 
Likelihood of 
Participation 
Table II.1. Summary of Expectations for Each Municipality Type 
 Of course, in order to understand how context affects mass opinions and 
behaviors and to evaluate the arguments developed above, we must have well-defined 
measures of the relevant concepts. The remaining pages of this chapter focus on my 
strategies for operationalizing not just state presence and Federation presence in a 
municipality, but also other contextual-level conditions that might play a role in 
explaining independent-level variation in political behaviors and attitudes. 
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The FNCC as a Highly Regarded Municipal Actor 
 Although not uniform across municipalities or across individuals, a primary 
assumption made throughout this project is that the FNCC is an organization that is, for 
the most part, perceived by Colombian as being effective and well managed. Although 
public data do not exist regarding the extent to which citizens trust or respect the 
Federation, a 2003 UNDP publication reports that among household in the coffee 
growing region, “the most recognized institutions for programs in the region are hospitals, 
coffee committee (the FNCC), and municipal governments, in that order” (UNDP 2003, 
152). Furthermore, anthropological and sociological studies (see Errazuriz 1986; Ortiz 
1999; London 2002) argue that at the municipal-level, the FNCC and its associated 
municipal coffee committees are well regarded and highly respected actors that are seen 
as reliable providers of goods and services. Finally, also associated with the FNCC (but 
separate from municipal committees) is the system of coffee cooperatives and 
depositories strategically maintained through coffee municipalities. Although affiliated 
coffee farmers are not mandated to sell their coffee to FNCC cooperative, the price 
guarantee they are afforded and goodwill toward the Federation motivates many to 
choose FNCC and ALMACAFE cooperative over private operators (Junguito and Pizano 
1997).  
 
Measuring Context in Colombian Municipalities  
 
 I argue that contextual variation in Colombian municipalities will affect 
significantly, both statistically and substantively, the perceptions, attitudes and behaviors 
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of Colombian citizens. This study is clearly not the first to hypothesize or analyze the 
effects of municipal context on mass attitudes and behaviors. Early research notes that at 
the community level, the concentration of economic power significantly affects the social 
and economic well-being of local residents, their propensity to participate in civic affairs, 
and their “problem solving capacity” (Mills and Ulmer 1970 [1946]; see also 
Goldschmidt 1947). More recently, political and other social scientists have, for the most 
part, corroborated and extended the original research results. Huckfeldt (1986) for 
example, finds that environmental conditions at the neighborhood level in the United 
States influence both individual political participation and “the relationship between 
participation and individual social status” (116). Others (Blanchard and Matthews 2006; 
Lyson, Torres and Welsh 2001; Oliver 1999) argue that varying economic conditions and 
concentration of economic power within US communities significantly affect levels of 
civic engagement and participation: “[…] economically concentrated environments 
alienate community members, resulting in an apathetic, disengaged local population” 
(Blanchard and Matthews 2006, 2245). Clearly, since at least the end of World War II in 
the United States, academics and policy makers have been interested in the contextual 
effects of municipal characteristics on citizens’ attitudes and behaviors.  
 In more recent years, as procedural and electoral democracy has become the norm 
in Latin America and it has become possible to conduct survey research in the region, 
scholars focusing on this area of the world have begun to examine the effects of 
municipal context on Latin Americans’ behaviors and attitudes.20 For instance, in the run-
up to Mexico’s historic elections in 2000, Hiskey and Bowler (2005) find that local 
                                                        
20 For an in-depth discussion on the recent advances in survey research in Latin America, see Zechmeister 
and Seligson (2011). 
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context affected citizens’ evaluations and perceptions of government. “In the case of 
Mexico, the direct experience of life under a subnational opposition government during 
the 1990s served to inculcate among citizens in those areas an acceptance of the fairness 
of elections and of the Mexican system as democratic, attitudes that in turn increased 
one’s willingness to engage in the formal political system” (Hiskey and Bowler 2005, 67).  
Likewise, recent research on the causes and consequences of the lack of 
interpersonal trust reveals that variation in subnational interpersonal trust in Costa Rica is 
“in great part explained by economic inequality within municipalities. The wider the gap 
between haves and have-nots at the local level, the lower the average level of 
interpersonal trust” (Córdova Guillén 2008, 148). Even in Colombia, political scientists 
have attempted to explain subnational variation in political behaviors and attitudes using 
contextual level dependent variables. Miguel García has found that both violent 
municipal contexts as well as the presence of illicit crops in a municipality affect voting 
behavior (e.g. turnout), protest participation and confidence in key government 
institutions (García 2009; 2011). Finally, similar to Córdova Guillén’s findings in Costa 
Rica, Espinosa and Rodríguez (2012) find that in Colombia, municipal level factors help 
in explaining individual level variation in interpersonal trust.  
 The accurate conceptualization and operationalization of the contextual level 
variables for the present study is critical. In this section, I will describe in-depth the 
contextual-level independent variables to be used in forthcoming empirical analyses. I 
will first explain how I measure state presence within a municipality and will then turn 
my attention to the measurement of FNCC presence. Finally, I will devote space to 
explaining the level-2 control variables that will be included in the analyses.    
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Measuring State Presence 
 For years, political scientists, sociologists and economists have been debating the 
merits of myriad methods of measuring state capacity; to date, there is little consensus on 
the subject and little evidence to suggest that this debate will end in the near future. As 
Cárdenas (2010) explains, there are at least four categories of state capacity: (1) military 
capacity, (2) bureaucratic and administrative capacity, (3) fiscal state capacity, and (4) 
“the quality and coherence of political institutions, which considers the degree of 
interference between the democratic and nondemocratic features of the political system” 
(Cárdenas 2010, 3). More often than not, however, any measure attempting to account for 
state capacity is constructed at the national level while making no attempts at ‘scaling 
down’ to the subnational.  In studies that have attempted to examine state capacity at the 
local level (Cleary 2007; Grindle 2007), measures of this concept have most often relied 
on government performance indicators such as public utility provision and access to 
healthcare and education services (Kurtz and Schrank 2012; Soifer 2012). 
 Given that in many Colombian municipalities, the FNCC serves as a de facto 
municipal government and provides or at least contributes to the provision of many 
public goods and utilities, the use of these measures as proxies for state presence in this 
project would be inappropriate. Therefore, in order to account for the presence of the 
state in a given municipality, I rely on the amount of central transfers (in millions of 
pesos) per capita for 2008. The national government’s Departamento de Planeación 
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(DNP) reports the amount of transfers to each municipality in a given year.21 While these 
transfers are not the only resources directed to the municipalities from the central 
government, I argue that this measure serves as a reliable proxy for state presence; the 
more a municipality receives in transfers (per capita), the more likely that municipality is 
to have a significant state presence within its borders. 
Although the Colombian state has carried out significant amounts of 
decentralization since the early 1990s, the fact remains that it is still a unitary (if 
decentralized) state (Lijphart 1999) and subnational governments, for the most part, are 
still very restricted in the revenue they can collect independent of the national 
government (Dillinger and Webb 1998; Escobar-Lemmon and Ross 2011), “… in most of 
Colombia’s more than 1,100 municipalities, almost all the funds they spend flow from 
above” (Bird 2011, 21). An exception to this rule, however, is that the largest cities in the 
country have traditionally had more autonomy from the national government in terms of 
revenue collection and have been able to manage local fiscal issues with an efficiency not 
seen in other localities throughout the country. These cities routinely receive less (on a 
per capita basis) than one would normally expect, and therefore, this indicator does not 
accurately measure state presence in these areas. For this reason, I drop from my analyses 
respondents nested in the four largest Colombian cities: Bogotá, Medellín, Cali and 
Barranquilla. Finally, I omit from this analysis the municipality of Guadalajara de Buga 
located in the pacific department of Valle de Cauca. In per capita terms, of those 
municipalities in the dataset, central transfers to municipalities in 2008 ranged from 2,360 
pesos to 659,600 pesos; the municipality of Guadalajara de Buga has a per capita value of 
                                                        
21 These data can be accessed from the DNP’s website at 
http://www.dnp.gov.co/Programas/DesarrolloTerritorial/FinanzasP%C3%BAblicasTerritoriales/Ejecucione
sPresupuestales.aspx (accessed 13 February 2013).  
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2.00 million pesos. Given that this municipality is a clear outlier and that it would 
unjustly skew the results of the analyses, I have removed all respondents from this 
municipality from the dataset. It should be noted that none of these five municipalities 
have an official coffee presence.   
After removing these observations 7,000 responses from 49 unique municipalities 
representing all regions of the country remain. In terms of the indicator I will use to 
measure state presence, there exists large variation in the amount central transfers per 
capita to the municipalities included in the dataset. For example, the municipality of 
Montería, the capital city of the department of Córdoba, receives the least amount in per 
capita transfers at 2,360 pesos per head, while in Chalán in the department of Sucre 
receives over 650,000 million pesos per resident. Figure II.3 presents 2008 transfer 
amounts in real terms for each municipality while Figure II.4 presents the amounts per 
capita. 
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Figure II.3. Real Central Government Transfers to Municipalities, 
2008. 
Figure II.4. Central Government Transfers Per Capita to 
Municipalities, 2008. 
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As is readily apparent in the figures above, in terms of real pesos transferred to 
municipalities, the tourist city of Cartagena received the most from the central 
government. Next is Cucuta and Bucaramanga, the capital cities of the departments of 
Norte de Santander and Santander. In terms of the least amount of central transfers by 
municipality in real terms, Sutamarchan, Confines and Abejorral are the three 
municipalities at the bottom of the list.  
 The results, however, change significantly once we account for the population of 
each locale. For example, in per capita terms, Cartagena is now sixth from the top while 
Confines has the highest value. The municipality of Montería finds itself solidly in the 
middle of municipalities in real terms; however, once population size is taken into 
consideration, it falls to the bottom of the list. 
 Although in this dissertation I use central transfers per capita to measure state 
presence, I am under no illusion that this is either the only, or even the perfect way to 
operationalize such a concept. However, given the trade-offs that every research project 
must make, I am confident in both the reliability and validity of the indicator. Of course, 
in an ideal world I would use a variety of both qualitative and quantitative methods to 
develop a more comprehensive measure of state presence; but given the nature of the 
questions asked in this dissertation, I am constrained to using one indicator to capture this 
complex concept. This measure serves the best methodological and empirical function, 
given resource and data constraints. 
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Measuring Federation Presence 
 Similar to the operationalization of state presence, the accurate measure of 
institutional influence is not a clear cut or straightforward endeavor. First, one must be 
sure to be measuring the concept he intends to analyze. In the case of the National Coffee 
Federation, it may be tempting to simply equate coffee production with Federation 
presence. While the two concepts are undoubtedly correlated, numerous studies have 
found that agricultural presence or other economic activities affect outcomes such as 
violence (Booth 1974), and political and civic participation (Blanchard and Matthews 
2006; Lyson, Torres and Welsh 2001; Oliver 1999). Therefore, for this study, it is 
important that I measure actual institutional presence or influence of the organization and 
not the presence of the crop. 
 Another issue that can impede the accurate measurement of an organization’s 
presence in a locale is the less stringent expectations for transparency. Although the 
FNCC is regarded by policy makers and other elites as being semi-public, it has not been 
required to meet the same standards of transparency that a full-fledged government 
organization would have to meet. Indeed, the FNCC has been criticized by economists 
and other social scientists for lacking true transparency and has been urged to be more 
forthcoming with information regarding the coffee sector in Colombia. To this end, 
however, it is extremely difficult to get specific amounts of social and other types of 
spending by the FNCC disaggregated to either the municipal or departmental level.  
 In recent years, scholars seeking to understand the influence of the Federation in 
municipalities have sought to use more accessible data in their quantitative analyses. One 
such alternative is using the number of FNCC staff or extensionistas in a municipality as 
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a proxy measure for Federation influence (see Muñoz Mora 2010). As Junguito and 
Pizano (1991; 1993) explain, the role of the extensionista in a coffee municipality is far-
reaching and goes well beyond simply supplying advice regarding coffee cultivation. 
These individuals facilitate how coffee farmers and member of the community interact 
with the large bureaucracy that is the Coffee Federation. These staffers are responsible 
for representing the FNCC at the municipal level and who are tasked with distributing the 
goods and services provided by the FNCC within the municipality. It is, therefore, 
reasonable to assume that an increased size in the FNCC staff in a municipality will also 
signify an increased influence of the organization within that locale.  
 As such, for this study, I will use the size of the Federation staff in a municipality 
to measure the overall presence of the FNCC in that area. In order to measure accurately 
this concept, instead of using real terms, I adjust for the size of the population by taking 
the number of extensionistas per 1,000 residents in a coffee municipality.  Figures II.5 
and II.6 below show the number of extensionistas in the municipalities included in the 
dataset in 2008 in both real and per capita terms as reported by the Coffee Federation. 
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Figure II.5. Real Number of Extensionistas by Municipality, 2008. Figure II.6. Per Capita Number of Extensionistas by Municipality, 2008. 
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 As can be gleaned from figures above, of the 49 municipalities contained in the 
dataset, 19 have an official coffee presence. In real terms, the number of extensionistas in 
a municipality ranges from zero in those cities and towns that do not have a coffee 
presence, to a maximum of 10 in the town of Rosas located in Cauca. Of course, once I 
adjust for population, the results change somewhat; of those municipalities with a coffee 
presence, there is a range of 0.0019 to 0.7751 extensionistas per 1,000 inhabitants.  
 
Controlling for Competing Hypotheses 
 In addition to the two primary contextual variables described above, the analyses 
in this dissertation will also include a host of control variables at both levels. Given that 
the focus of this study is to understand the independent institutional effect of the Coffee 
Federation on mass behaviors and attitudes, it is important that I isolate this concept to 
the extent possible while working within the constraints imposed by the chosen research 
strategy. The first control variable included in the multivariate analyses is the percentage 
of a municipality’s area devoted to the cultivation of coffee. Collected from Colombia’s 
National Geographic Institute, this measure accounts for findings by sociologists (Lyson 
et al. 2001; Troy and Matthew 2006) that, at least at the ecological level, a municipality’s 
economic concentration and scale of agricultural production affect civic behavior. Finally, 
studies have found systematic differences between Colombian municipalities with high 
concentration of coffee production and those with no coffee activity (Muñoz Mora 2010).   
 The unsatisfied basic needs (UBN) variable measures the level of macro-poverty 
in a municipality. In essence, as the value of UBN increases, so too does the level of 
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poverty found in a municipality, as measured by the percentage of households lacking 
pre-determined basic needs.22 Finally, violence has been found to have a significant effect 
at both the ecological and individual-level on political participation throughout Latin 
America (Batteson 2012). Also, previous research on political behavior in Colombian 
municipalities has found that the presence of armed groups systematically affects voter 
turnout and vote choice among citizens as well as trust in political institutions (Garcia 
2009; 2011). Table II.2 below presents the descriptive statistics and short description of 
the contextual control variables to be used in this study. 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION MIN MAX STANDARD 
DEVIATION 
MEASUREMENT
UNIT 
Coffee Proportion of land in a 
municipality devoted to 
the production of coffee 
0 30.6 6.8593 Percentages 
UBN Proportion of household 
in a given area that is 
considered to lacking 
basic needs.23 
10.03 100 21.0495 0-100 scale 
Violence Homicides per 1,000 
residents 
3.9634 85.7232 21.6993 Number of 
homicides per 
100,000 residents 
(continuous) 
State Presence Central transfers to 
municipalities  
0.0236 0.6596 0.1227 Millions of pesos, 
per capita 
(continuous) 
Federation 
Presence 
Number of FNCC staff 
in a municipality 
0 0.7751 0.1205 Number of staff per 
1,000 inhabitants 
Table II.2. Description of contextual level variables     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
22 For a more technical discussion of the unsatisfied basic needs (UBN) index, see Feres and Mancero 
2001 
23 For more information on how DANE, the Colombian government’s statistics office, calculates 
unsatisfied basic needs, see: 
http://www.dane.gov.co/en/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=231&Itemid=66 (accessed 
13 February 2013) 
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 Coffee UBN Violence State Presence Federation 
Presence 
Coffee 1.00 
UBN -0.218 
(0.129)
1.00 
Violence 0.157 
(0.275)
-0.030 
(0.834)
1.00 
State Presence -0.083 
(0.565)
0.170 
(0.237)
0.096 
(0.507)
1.00
Federation 
Presence 
0.421 
(0.002)
0.161 
(0.264)
0.305 
(0.031)
-0.125 
(0.387)
1.00
Table II.3. Correlation matrix of contextual variables, significance levels in parentheses  
  
The final table in this chapter presents the correlations (and their p-values) for the 
contextual variables used in the proceeding analyses. In all, there do not appear to be any 
relationships that would cause concern for multi-collinearity;24 indeed, of the 10 pairs 
included in the table, only two have relationships that are considered to be statistically 
significant at the .05 level. The number of extensionistas and homicide rates correlate at 
0.305 (for why, see Muñoz Mora 2010) and expectedly, the correlation between coffee 
and extensionistas is significant at 0.42. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Political scientists, economists, anthropologists and others have noted the 
important influences of the National Coffee Federation on Colombian society, politics 
and economics. In this chapter, I have described in detail the development of the FNCC 
into the institution it is today since its founding at the second National Coffee Congress 
                                                        
24 A common rule of thumb that is used to detect multi-collinearity between two regressors is a correlation 
of 0.8 or higher (see: Gujarati 2004, ch. 10).  
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in Medellín in 1927. In both the international and domestic arenas, the FNCC plays a 
pivotal role in setting and executing economic and social policies and projects. 
The FNCC can most definitely be considered corporatist in nature. Using the 
criteria put forward by Collier and Collier in 1979, the Coffee Federation meets them all; 
it is heavily subsidized by the central government, it has what can essentially be 
considered a compulsory membership base, and the national government plays an active 
role in both the appointment of key positions as well as the implementation and execution 
of organization policy.  
Given the clear corporatist characteristics as well as the institutional development 
of the FNCC, I contend that this particular case is an ideal one in which to assess the 
impact of corporatist organizations and structures in Latin American political behavior 
and attitudes. To do this, I use a number of indicators to measure state presence, 
Federation presence and other institutional characteristics in Colombian municipalities. 
By employing econometric approaches that appropriately account for the hierarchical 
nature of the research question, this study will be among the first to understand how this 
peculiar institutional arrangement might affect important aspects of democratic 
development and consolidation in Latin America.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
 
COFFEE, CORPORATISM, AND CITIZEN TRUST IN AND SATISFACTION 
WITH GOVERNMENT 
 
  
 
 As democracy and neo-liberal economic policies have both broadened and 
deepened during the past 30 years in Latin America, subnational governments have been 
called upon to play more meaningful roles in the lives of those living in the region. 
Nowhere is this truer than in Colombia. Although the country is still considered unitary 
(Lijphart 1999), since the 1980s the extent of decentralization that has taken place within 
its borders would rival that of any other country in the hemisphere. “In view of its long 
history as a high centralized unitary state, Colombia seemed an unlikely candidate for 
decentralization. Yet since the first decentralizing reforms were introduced in 1982, it has 
evolved into one of the more decentralized countries in Latin America” (Willis et al. 
2007, 29). Indeed, mayors were not popularly elected until the passage of an amendment 
to the constitution in 1986 and governors not until the ratification of a new constitution in 
1991.1  
 As decentralization processes have deepened in Latin America and subnational 
governments have assumed greater responsibility in the administration of social services, 
infrastructural development, education and other programs, scholars have recognized the 
importance of understanding citizens’ perceptions of local governments and their 
satisfaction with the provision of local services. Given that much of the Federation’s 
social programs and activities in Colombia are administered at the municipal level, I 
                                                        
1 The first mayoral elections took place in 1988 while the first gubernatorial elections in Colombia occurred 
in 1994. 
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argue in this chapter that to have an accurate understanding of how Colombians view 
their local governments, it is essential to account for the degree to which those 
governments have been supplanted by non-governmental actors, in this case, the FNCC.  
 The primary focus of this chapter is to understand the independent effect of 
FNCC’s influence on citizens’ trust in various levels government and their satisfaction 
with the provision of local services in their communities. To accomplish this, I organize 
the chapter in the following way: section I briefly explains processes of decentralization 
that have occurred in Latin America and Colombia more specifically since the 1980s; 
section II examines the importance of understanding citizen trust in democratic 
institutions and procedures. Drawing from the previous two chapters of this dissertation, 
in section III I develop my expectations regarding the effects of the FNCC on citizen trust 
and satisfaction and put forward a series of testable hypotheses. Section IV discusses the 
empirical strategy and presents the results of hierarchical linear models while section V 
offers a discussion of these results and concludes.  
 
Decentralization in Latin America and Colombia 
 
 Along with the transition to democracy and the implementation of open-market 
economic systems, a defining feature of change in the last 30 years in Latin America has 
been the significant levels of decentralization within the region. Subnational governments 
are no longer simply extensions of central governments in national capitals but are 
autonomous (if not sovereign) entities charged with the administration and provision of 
some of the most important government services available to citizens including 
healthcare, infrastructure and education. Furthermore, leaders of provincial and local 
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governments are no longer handpicked at the national level, but are elected by the 
citizens to whom they have a constitutional obligation.   
 Of course, this has not always been the case. Historically, Latin American 
countries tended to consolidate much of the political, fiscal and administrative powers 
and duties of the state within the central government and although some countries 
experimented with more federal and/or decentralized systems of government, 
decentralization did not become a clear policy objective until the commencement of the 
most recent wave of democratization in the 1970s. In conjunction with efforts to 
consolidate electoral democracy and implement neo-liberal economic policies in the 
region, international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund along with a number of lender countries focused on putting into place 
theories of local government in Latin America “which argue that decentralization 
improves democracy by bringing the government closer to the people” (Falleti 2010, 5). 
By doing this, citizens would become more motivated to participate within the political 
system and hold their elected officials accountable in ways that would be difficult or 
impossible at the national level. Economically speaking, Falleti explains that proponents 
argue “fiscal decentralization improves resource allocation through better knowledge of 
local preferences and competition among jurisdictions” (ibid).  By incorporating both 
political and economic theories of decentralization, it was argued that corruption, theft 
and inefficiency would decrease while democratic attitudes, vertical accountability and 
political competition would improve.  
 Pressure to decentralize not only came from outside Latin America, but also from 
within the countries themselves. A large literature in comparative politics has sought to 
understand how internal forces in the region have affected the processes and degree of 
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decentralization in the region. A major factor shown to affect decentralization processes 
in the region is the institutional makeup of the political system in a given country. 
Specifically, it is argued that decentralization occurs as part of a negotiated process 
between elite actors at the national and subnational levels in a country’s political system. 
The results of these negotiations and the levels and degree of decentralization in a given 
society, according to Willis et al. (1999), “will depend heavily on the lines of 
accountability within political parties. In systems with centralized political parties, the 
central government has exercised greater control over resources and uses than in 
countries with decentralized parties, in which subnational politicians exercise influence 
over legislators” (7).  In the case of Colombia, a decentralization plan that was put in 
place by a president to confront a growing fiscal crisis was soon usurped by subnational 
forces because of the strong regional party institutions.  
 Electoral prospects have also been attributed to decentralization outcomes in Latin 
America (Escobar-Lemmon 2003; O’Neil 2003; 2005); political parties that foresee 
greater electoral success at the subnational level will favor decentralization over parties 
that anticipate greater fortunes at the national level. Indeed, while O’Neill (2003) concurs 
with Willis et al.’s contention that political parties and the political party system have an 
explicit role to play in decentralization, she argues that it has more to do with survival 
than with bargaining positions. “Decentralization,” she argues, “occurred in Colombia 
when the party in a position to reorganize intragovernmental power saw its probability of 
gaining or retaining the presidency as weak” (O’Neill 2005, 90). Therefore, as parties 
view defeat at the national level as inevitable and long lasting, they will look to 
decentralize processes and mechanisms of governance to subnational levels where they 
are more competitive.  
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 A final subdivision of decentralization looks beyond the initial decision of 
whether to decentralize or not and instead focuses on how the implementation of 
decentralization affects its final outcomes. Falleti (2005, 2010), in her sequential theory 
of decentralization, contends that in order to truly understand the process of 
decentralization, scholars must first detangle it and recognize its three distinct parts: 
administrative, fiscal and political. By doing this, Falleti demonstrates that “the 
sequential order of different types of decentralization explains the resulting change in the 
intergovernmental balance of power” (2010, 17). Given that the decentralization process 
in Colombia was largely driven by subnational actors and interests, the process was 
undertaken in such a way as to maximize the benefits of those who were most in control, 
“The process of decentralization in Colombia followed a sequence of reforms that 
conformed to the preferences of subnational actors. Political autonomy was devolved first, 
followed by resources, and finally by responsibilities” (Falleti 2005, 341). By 
experiencing decentralization through this particular sequence, the process devolved 
significant powers and autonomy to the subnational level, particularly municipalities. 
 As countries throughout Latin America, and especially Colombia, have undergone 
significant amounts of decentralization in the past 30 years, scholars have recognized the 
importance of understanding government-citizen relations at the sub-national level. 
However, these analyses typically do not account for many of the unique institutional 
characteristics found throughout the region. Specifically, in Colombia, in order to 
ascertain the extent to which citizens trust their subnational governments and are satisfied 
with the provision of local services, scholars must account for the continuing corporatist 
state-society relationships that are found at the municipal level and explicitly recognize 
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that in many municipalities throughout the country, the role of local governments is 
undertaken by the semi-private National Federation of Colombian Coffee-Growers. 
 
Trust in Government in (Latin) America 
  
Most frequently defined as “the ratio of people’s evaluation of government 
performance relative to their normative expectations of how government ought to 
perform” (Hetherington and Husser 2012, 313), political trust has been a well-studied 
topic by scholars of American politics. Indeed, since social science’s behavioral 
revolution in the 1950s, scholars have been examining how behaviors and attitudes affect 
levels of trust in “the government in Washington.” Scholars such as Citrin and Green 
(1986) discovered that in the American context, presidential leadership and economic 
success often times serve as catalyst to increases in mass trust toward the government; 
these gains, however, are mostly short-lived. More permanent are findings by Easton 
(1975) and Gamson (1968) of a simultaneous relationship between trust and institutional 
support; “once lost,” remarks Hetherington in summarizing these works, “institutional 
support is more difficult to recover” (1998, 791).   
In what has become a seminal study on the impact trust in government has on 
support for democratic institutions in the United States, Hetherington (1998) offers a 
compelling argument that political trust, rather than simply being “a reflection of 
dissatisfaction with political leaders,” is a cause of decline in diffuse support for political 
and democratic institutions as well as for the democratic system of governance in general. 
Furthermore, in their examination of Bolivia’s experience with decentralization, Hiskey 
and Seligson (2003) find that while this process can serve to strengthen support for 
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democracy, “the renewed emphasis on local government can have the… effect of 
producing more negative views of the political system when performance of local 
institutions falters” (64). Given Latin America’s continuing effort to consolidate its 
fragile democracies and the role citizens have to play in this process (see Linz and Stepan 
1996), it would seem that understanding citizen trust toward government and key 
democratic institutions would be vital in achieving these goals, however, relatively little 
attention has been paid to this subject.  
One comparative study on trust in government and institutions in Latin America 
comes from Boidi (2009) whose examination of mass trust in Latin American legislatures 
is one of the few studies that seeks to extend this research from the American context to 
the comparative realm. Boidi finds that trust in legislatures is significantly and positively 
correlated with core democratic concepts such as support for democracy and support for 
the rule of law. In this chapter, I seek to extend our understanding of trust in government 
and democratic institutions by examining how parallel organizations affect citizen trust in 
sub-national governments. Given the relatively recent yet ever increasing shift of 
responsibilities from the national to the sub-national realm, understanding the extent to 
which citizens in Latin America trust municipal, provincial, and even national levels of 
government is of utmost importance. To contribute to this understanding, I examine to 
what extent the FNCC affect trust in governments throughout Colombia.  
 
 
 
The FNCC’s Effect on Trust in Subnational Colombian Governments 
 
 In many Colombian municipalities, it is not necessarily the local government or 
other state institutions that provide citizens with the goods and services they have come 
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to expect from their local officials. In many municipalities, the semi-public, yet unelected 
and unaccountable, National Coffee Federation fulfills its corporatist responsibilities by 
taking an active role in the development and administration of healthcare, education, 
infrastructure, and other tasks usually reserved for government bureaucracies. Per the 
contractual agreement the FNCC has with the national government via the Ministry of 
Finance and Public Credit, many of the services provided by the organization are not 
restricted just to Federation members, but are available (and indeed, intended) for all 
residents in a given municipality. In this chapter, I argue that the extent to which the 
FNCC has supplanted the local government and in some cases become an alternative 
government will affect how citizens perceive of and trust in governmental entities and 
institutions. Furthermore, I contend that the degree to which the FNCC has supplanted 
the state in a municipality will also influence citizen satisfaction with the provision of 
local services in their communities. However, this effect will not be uniform or constant 
across all municipalities that have an official coffee presence, but will be dependent on 
the extent to which the FNCC has effectively supplanted local government institutions 
and become, in the words of eminent Colombian economist Miguel Urrutia, a “state 
within a state.” 
 Although the Coffee Federation is contractually obligated to provide a number of 
services to entire municipalities and communities, it is not required to do so anonymously. 
In municipalities with a Coffee Federation presence, the most recognizable individuals 
are oftentimes the employees of the FNCC. Dressed in their trademarked bright yellow 
shirts, FNCC employees are viewed as being dedicated, loyal and competent public 
servants. In smaller communities, or in municipalities where the FNCC is the legitimate 
provider of public goods, the organization’s leader in the area, the jefe seccional, is 
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regarded a though he were a local elected official, or the town mayor. These individuals 
are responsible for organizing, distributing and implementing all goods and activities 
provided by the FNCC. 
 As mentioned above, the effect of the FNCC on citizens’ perceptions of their 
government at various levels as well as their satisfaction with the provision of local 
services will not vary based solely on the presence (or lack thereof) of the FNCC, but will 
also depend, in large part, on the extent to which the FNCC has replaced or supplanted 
government institutions and responsibilities. Consistent with general theory developed in 
chapter II, I expect that in municipalities where there is one strong institutional actor 
(either the government or the Coffee Federation), residents will be comparatively more 
satisfied with local services as well more trusting in government than residents in other 
types of municipalities. In these municipalities, citizens will lack a point of comparison 
with which to evaluate the performance and competency of their local goods provider. It 
is also possible that in municipalities where the Coffee Federation is the principal 
provider of public goods, and the state is relatively inactive residents may not distinguish 
between the goods and services being provided by the FNCC and those not being 
provided by the government, leading residents to hold general feelings of goodwill and 
high trust toward the state.  
 Conversely, in municipalities where neither the state nor the Federation has a 
strong presence, trust in government as well as satisfaction with local services should be 
the lowest among the four types of municipalities. This result, taken together with the 
expectation that LS/HF municipalities will have values similar to HS/LF municipalities, 
would provide significant evidence of a continued corporatist presence in subnational 
Colombia. The only difference between the LS/HF municipalities and the LS/LF 
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municipalities is the presence of the Federation; therefore, if the difference in attitudes 
and perceptions varies significantly between these types of municipalities, such a 
difference would be attributable to the presence (or lack thereof) of the FNCC. 
 Finally, in municipalities where the state and the Federation both have high 
presences, I expect trust in government and satisfaction with local services to be highest. 
In HS/HF municipalities residents benefit from a competent and effective state presence 
while also enjoying an equally competent and equally effective Federation presence. In 
areas where the state might be lacking in terms of public service provision, the FNCC, in 
its complementary role, will be there to provide such services, resulting in the most 
trusting and most satisfied group of citizens. Table III.1 below summarizes the 
expectations developed above.   
 
Table III.1. Expected Impact of Municipal Context on Citizen Perceptions. 
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EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
 Using the empirical strategy described in chapter I, in this section I test the effect 
of the FNCC on citizen perceptions and attitudes toward their government and 
satisfaction with the services being provided in the municipality. I will examine the 
effects of the FNCC on four attitudinal dependent variables: trust in municipal 
government, trust in departmental government, trust in national government and 
satisfaction with local services. Below I explain in-depth how these variables are 
constructed, their justification for being included in the analysis, and the average values 
for each variable in each municipality between 2004 and 2010. Finally, before I can 
conduct a hierarchical linear analysis, I must first ensure that there are significant 
amounts of variation to be explained between groups, in this case, at the municipal level. 
To do this, I present the results of fully unspecified hierarchical linear models for each of 
the dependent variables.  
 
Trust in Municipal Government 
Since 2004, the Latin America Public Opinion Project’s survey in Colombia ascertained 
citizens’ perceptions of local government by asking respondents to state, on a 1-7 scale, 
“To what point do you trust in your municipal government?”2 Below, the mean scores for 
each municipality between 2004 and 2010 are presented as reconfigured on a 0 to100 
scale.  
                                                        
2 The original wording of the question in Spanish is: “¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en su 
alcadía?” 
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                             Figure III.1. Average levels of trust in municipal government by municipality, 2004-2010 
 
 As is apparent from the results presented in Figure III.1 above, trust in municipal 
government varies significantly between the 50 municipalities included in the LAPOP 
dataset. On the 0-100 scale, eight municipalities have averages that exceed 60 points with 
the municipality of Abejorral, Antioquia holding the highest average at 69.3. On the other 
end of the spectrum, seven municipalities hold average scores of less than 45 points on 
the 0-100 scale. Ibague, the capital of the department of Tolima is the municipality with 
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the lowest average score for trust in municipal government between 2004 and 2010 with 
a score of 34.9.  
 While a glance at Figure III.1 makes it clear that there is sufficient variation 
between municipalities to warrant hierarchical analyses, it is important to ensure that any 
variation that exists between the level-2 units is statistically distinguishable from zero and 
that the variation is not simply explained by individual-level factors such as socio-
demographic, attitudinal, or behavioral attributes. To assess the proportion of variation to 
be explained at each level of analysis it is common to estimate a fully unconditional 
model. In explaining this technique, Raudenbush and Byrk (2002) comment “The 
simplest three-level model is fully unconditional; that is, no predictor variables are 
specified at any level. Such a model represents how variation in an outcome measure is 
allocated across the three different levels (child, classroom, and school)” (228). Of course, 
in the present situation, the levels of analysis are individual nested in municipality nested 
in year. Below, Table III.2 presents the results of the fully unconditional model for trust 
in municipal government. 
 Trust in Municipal 
Government (b32) 
  
Constant 52.7130*** 
(1.3171) 
Variance Components  
     Level 1 (Individual) 
     Level 2 (Municipality) 
     Level 3 (Year) 
862.625 
65.0360 
9.8929 
  
N obs individual level (1) 7,145 
N obs municipal level (2) 337 
N obs year level (3) 7 
Log likelihood -34452..067 
Chi(2) 282.32 
  
Table III.2.  Results of fully unconditional model for trust in municipal                
government 
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 To calculate the proportion of variance to be explained across municipalities, one 
must divide the municipal-level variance by the sum of the variance components at all 
three levels of analysis. Therefore, the equation for this particular case is the following: 
 
65.0360 
_____________________________ 
(862.625+65.0360+9.8929) 
  
  The result of this equation is 0.0694 meaning that an estimated 7% of the variance 
of the dependent variable is explained across municipalities as opposed to across 
individuals or years. Finally, a chi-squared analysis suggests the difference between 
variance components at the three levels to be statistically significant.  Alternatively, about 
92% of the variation in the dependent variable can be found at level-1 (the individual-
level) while a negligible (~1%) can be attributed to difference between survey years. It 
should come as no surprise that most of the variation in the individual-level dependent 
variable can be found at the individual-level; however, this analysis demonstrates that 
there exists unexplained variation in the dependent variable that can be attributed to 
differences between municipalities. Explaining this variation is my primary concern in 
this project. Finally, the negligible amount of variation found between years is a 
comforting discovery and speaks to the overall validity of the LAPOP surveys conducted 
in Colombia. This signifies that a statistically significant amount of variation (i.e. non-
zero) is found between the level-2 groups and warrants a hierarchical analysis.  
 
Trust in Departmental and National Government 
 Given the unitary form of the Colombian government as well as evidence from 
previous research suggesting a strong link between the three levels of government, in this 
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chapter I also examine the extent to which the presence of the Coffee Federation is 
related to  trust in departmental and national governments. Similar to the trust in 
municipal government item described above, the question wording for the two current 
items are “To what point do you trust in the government of your department?” and “To 
what point do you trust in the national government?”3 The average levels of trust in 
departmental government and national government, on the recoded 0-100 scale by 
municipality are presented below in Figures III.2 and III.3, respectively.  
 
                                                        
3 The original Spanish wording for these questions are: “¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la 
Gobernación de su departamento?” and “¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el Gobierno Nacional?” 
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          Figure III.2. Average levels of trust in departmental government by municipality,                 
          2004-2009 
 
 At first glance, it appears that average levels of trust in departmental government 
are higher than those for municipal government. Indeed, while no municipality had 
average levels of trust exceeding 70 points in the case of municipal government, for 
departmental government, three municipalities exceed the 70-point mark—Rosas, 
Abejorral, and Marinilla. Also, while in the case of municipal governance, seven 
municipalities had average of less than 45, in the case of trust in departmental 
government, only one municipality, Santa Marta, the capital of the department of 
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Magdalena, falls below 45 points with an average of 41.7. Finally, because this particular 
question was not included on the 2010 AmericasBarometer survey, only the years 2004 to 
2009 are analyzed.  
  
           Figure III.3. Average levels of trust in national government by municipality, 2004-2010                
           
 Average levels of trust in national government by municipality between 2004 and 
2010 are presented in Figure III.3 above. In the case of trust in national government, nine 
municipalities have average levels in excess of 70 points with five of those, San Juan 
Nepomuceno, Mita, Ayapel, Santuario, and Abejorral exceeding 74 points. In contrast, 
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only one municipality has an average level of trust in the national government that falls 
below 50 points on the 0-100 scale; Pasto, the capital of the department of Nariño has an 
average of 49.8. 
 Table III.3 below presents the fully unconditional hierarchical linear models for 
trust in departmental and trust in national governments.  
 Trust in Departmental 
Government (b33) 
Trust in National 
Government (b14) 
   
Constant 58.6701*** 
(1.8023) 
62.3694*** 
(0.7956) 
Variance Components   
     Level 1 (Individual) 
     Level 2 (Municipality) 
     Level 3 (Year) 
731.1 
58.1575 
11.0071 
837.0267 
61.5056 
2.2781 
   
N obs individual level (1) 3,995 7,107 
N obs municipal level (2) 193 337 
N obs year level (3) 4 7 
Log likelihood -18937.11 -34156.274 
Chi(2) 170.00 208.25 
   
Table III.3.  Results of fully unconditional model for trust in departmental and national         
government 
 For both trust in departmental government and trust in national government, the 
results of the fully unconditional hierarchical linear model demonstrate significant 
variation to be explained between the level-2 units. For the former, the estimated 
proportion of variation at the second level is 0.0727 while in the case of trust in national 
government the proportion of variation between municipalities is 0.0683.  Again, as was 
the case for trust in municipal government, about 7% of the variation in these dependent 
variables is found between the level-2 groups.  
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Satisfaction with Local Services 
 The final dependent variable to be analyzed in this chapter is satisfaction with 
local services. More specifically, the LAPOP questionnaire asks respondents, “Would 
you say that the services that the municipality is providing to the people are very good, 
good, neither good nor bad, bad, or very bad?”4 Similar to the questions described above, 
I expect that on average, Colombians living in municipalities with two strong institutional 
actors will be most satisfied with the provision of local services in the community while 
citizens living in municipalities where one institution has a high presence will also be 
relatively satisfied with local services. In municipalities with no significant institutional 
presence, satisfaction will be comparatively low. As is the case with the previous 
variables, the current dependent variable has been recoded onto a 0-100 scale; 0 
signifying dissatisfaction with the provision of local services and 100 signifying 
satisfaction. Below, in Figure III.4, the average values for each municipality between 
2004 and 2010 in terms of satisfaction with local services are presented.  
 
 
                                                        
4 The original Spanish wording for this question is: “¿Diría usted que los servicios que el municipio está 
dando a la gente son muy buenos, buenos, ni buenos ni malos, malos, o muy malos?” 
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Figure III.4. Average levels of satisfaction with local services by municipality, 2004-
2010        
 
 Between the municipalities included in the dataset, significant variation exists in 
terms of average levels of satisfaction with local services. Indeed, with a span of about 30 
points, it is clear that Colombians hold varying views when it comes to the provision of 
services in their municipalities. Of the 50 municipalities included, 13 have average levels 
below the midpoint with Ibague being the only municipality with an average below 40 at 
38.1 points. Alternatively, eight municipalities have average levels of satisfaction with 
local services exceeding 60 points; Manizales, the capital of the department of Caldas in 
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the Eje Cafetero has the highest average at 69.3. Finally, as Table III.4 demonstrates 
below, about 12.29% of the variation that exists in the dependent variable can be 
explained between municipalities, as opposed to between years or individuals.  
 Satisfaction with Local 
Services (sgl1) 
  
Constant 54.9360*** 
(0.5171) 
Variance Components  
     Level 1 (Individual) 
     Level 2 (Municipality) 
     Level 3 (Year) 
377.5945 
52.9780 
0.3751 
  
N obs individual level (1) 7,215 
N obs municipal level (2) 337 
N obs year level (3) 7 
Log likelihood -31873.74 
Chi(2) 489.09 
  
Table III.4. Results of fully unconditional model for satisfaction with local 
services 
 
Individual Level Covariates 
 The primary advantage to using hierarchical regression techniques is the ability to 
assess both contextual and individual-level effects simultaneously on the dependent 
variable. In chapter II I explained in-depth the level-2 variables to be included in the 
regression analyses throughout the dissertation including measurement decisions 
regarding the specification of state and FNCC presence. Here I will briefly describe the 
individual-level covariates to be included in the analyses in chapters III and IV; for more 
information on these variables, including actual question wording, see appendix I.  
 Given that the overarching goal of this research project is to understand the 
effects of a contextual situation at the municipal level on how Colombians perceive of 
and interact with their government, the primary purpose of the individual-level covariates 
is to control for competing hypotheses or explanations at that level of analysis. Therefore, 
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the vast majority of explanatory variables at this level are the standard socio-economic 
and demographic variables commonly found in analyses seeking to understand mass 
attitudes and behaviors. In the multivariate models presented in chapters III and IV, 
individual-level attributes such as a respondent’s education level, age, political ideology,5 
and sex are included. Additionally, the analyses also control for a respondent’s evaluation 
of the current national economy and for her level of political knowledge or sophistication.  
 Two variables that have been included for their theoretical importance are the 
dummy variables, ‘agricultor’ and ‘peon’. While many of the activities and services 
undertaken by the FNCC are available to all resident of a given municipalities, there are 
services that are exclusive to associated coffee farmers. It is conceivable that the 
Colombian with a more intimate relationship to the Federation may be affected 
differently than residents who happen to live in a coffee municipality but whose daily 
routines do not bring them into regular contact with the FNCC. Unfortunately, the 
LAPOP survey in Colombia does not ask respondents whether they are members of the 
FNCC, but it does ask their occupation. In an effort to begin to understand how one’s 
association with the Coffee Federation might affect how they perceive of and act within 
the political realm, I have separated all those who answered that they were farmers 
(owned their own land) or that they worked on someone else’s farm (peón). By doing this, 
I will be able to interact these variables with the Federation variable to begin to find 
                                                        
5 Political ideology as measured by self-placement on a left-right or liberal-conservative scale has long 
presented a conundrum for scholars of political behavior. Although this variable is often times theoretically 
and empirically important to include when specifying multivariate models explaining mass behaviors and 
attitudes, the significant nonresponse to this question removes in a non-random fashion many observations 
(see Zechmeister and Corral 2013). In order to include this important individual-level attribute but to avoid 
unnecessarily removing observations from the analyses, I include the political ideology of the respondent 
into the models as a series of dummy variables. On the 0 to 10 left-right ideological scales, those who 
answered 1, 2, 3, or 4 are coded as “Leftist”; 5 and 6 as “Center” and 7, 8, 9, and 10 as “Rightist”. These 
categories are then compared against the reference category, those respondents who did not give a valid 
response (coded as “0”).  
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evidence of a systematic relationship between those who might be associated with the 
Coffee Federation in high federation municipalities and those who probably are not.  
   
Results 
 Table III.5 below presents the results of the hierarchical linear models used to 
estimate the contextual impact of the FNCC, conditional on state presence, on citizen 
trust in the various levels of government and their satisfaction with local services at the 
municipal level. In all four analyses, the Federation variable achieves conventional levels 
of statistical significance, meaning that in municipalities with a value of zero for state 
presence, the presence of the Coffee Federation will, on average, increase levels of trust 
in government and satisfaction with local services.  
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Trust in Municipal 
Government  
(b32) 
Trust in 
Departmental 
Government (b33) 
Trust in National 
Government  
(b14) 
Satisfaction with 
Municipal Services
(sgl1) 
     
Constant 44.5791** 
(3.5036) 
53.4328** 
(4.4574) 
41.3023** 
(3.2268) 
46.6590** 
(2.4140) 
Contextual Level     
FNCC Presence 157.3541** 
(47.6057) 
143.5701* 
(57.7385) 
144.7544** 
(44.6476) 
102.0322** 
(36.5105) 
State Presence 1.3348* 
(0.5765) 
-0.5665 
(0.7187) 
0.6499 
(0.5386) 
1.0442* 
(0.4380) 
FNCC*State  -57.7248** 
(17.2940) 
-45.1287* 
(2.4773) 
-49.8453** 
(16.1762) 
-38.9404* 
(13.1567) 
UBN -0.0252 
(0.0324) 
-0.0214 
(0.0394) 
0.0802** 
(0.0305) 
-0.1119** 
(0.0246) 
Coffee Area 0.1213 
(0.1228) 
-0.0190 
(0.1425) 
0.0484 
(0.1146) 
0.3224** 
(0.0911) 
Homicide Rate -0.0070 
(0.0291) 
-0.0080 
(0.0347) 
-0.0676* 
(0.0272) 
-0.0096 
(0.0223) 
Individual Level      
Education -1.6356* 
(0.6815) 
-0.2556 
(0.9103) 
-0.71685 
(0.6660) 
0.3558 
(0.4513) 
Age 0.8644** 
(0.3255) 
0.4538 
(0.4065) 
2.2184** 
(0.3214) 
-0.3251 
(0.2138) 
Leftist Ideology -5.0293** 
(1.5545) 
-3.1414 
(1.9211) 
-8.6341** 
(1.5371) 
-2.1364* 
(1.0323) 
Centrist Ideology 1.3971 
(1.3260) 
3.3728* 
(1.6665) 
-0.0471 
(1.3117) 
0.1532 
(0.8768) 
Rightist Ideology 3.9724** 
(1.2476) 
4.2004** 
(1.5875) 
4.2360** 
(1.2355) 
-0.8471 
(0.8239) 
Agricultor -2.5945* 
(1.3072) 
-3.1050^ 
(1.6090) 
0.0837 
(1.2871) 
-0.0282 
(0.8679) 
Peon -1.3634 
(1.8911) 
-4.3604^ 
(2.2767) 
-2.8565 
(1.8730) 
0.6847 
(1.2622) 
Female 2.4704** 
(0.8756) 
0.6972 
(1.1028) 
0.6510 
(0.8628) 
2.0322** 
(0.5769) 
Wealth -0.5568^ 
(0.3217) 
-0.3323 
(0.4256) 
-0.0321 
(0.3166) 
0.4638* 
(0.2160) 
Sociotropic Evaluation 0.1791** 
(0.0206) 
0.1441** 
(0.0260) 
0.2410** 
(0.0203) 
0.1490** 
(0.0136) 
Political Knowledge -0.0387* 
(0.0164) 
 
-0.0102 
(0.0204) 
0.0475** 
(0.0161) 
-0.0045 
(0.0108) 
Variance Components     
     Level 1 (Individual) 
     Level 2 (Municipality) 
     Level 3 (Year) 
818.4965 
52.0665 
7.3230 
715.7889 
37.7869 
10.3490 
798.6726 
40.3528 
1.1658 
357.9053 
38.4908 
1.1151 
     
N obs individual level (1) 4,934 2,711 4,914 4,976 
N obs municipal level (2) 323 185 323 323 
N obs year level (3) 7 4 7 7 
Log restricted-likelihood -23656.324 -12810.733 -23481.319 -21839.86 
     
Table III.5. Results of hierarchical linear models. Standard errors in parentheses. ^p>.1 *p>.05 **p>.01 
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The results presented in Table III.5 suggest that in terms of trust in government 
and satisfaction with local services, the presence of the Coffee Federation, relative to that 
of the state has a significant effect. Indeed, across the four analyses displayed above, the 
interaction variable measuring FNCC presence conditional to state presence is significant 
and negative. Furthermore, aside from the effect of state presence on trust in 
departmental government, both constitutive terms are positive, although the effect of state 
presence on trust in national government fails to reach statistical significance. Taken 
together, these results signify a negative moderating relationship between the presence of 
the Federation and the presence of the state in a given municipality on individual-level 
attitudes toward government and satisfaction with services. Unfortunately because of the 
complexity of both the data and of the interaction terms themselves, aside from the sign 
and significance of the estimated coefficients, it is difficult to discern much else from the 
results presented above. For this reason, and to discuss more in-depth the relationship 
between the dependent variables and other independent variables, I will evaluate the 
results of each model in more substantive terms below.  
 
Trust in Municipal Government 
 The estimated effects of the individual-level independent variables on trust in 
municipal government in Colombia are hardly surprising. Of the eleven variables 
included in the model, nine achieve at least marginal levels of significance. As is 
suggested with the negative coefficient, a negative relationship exists between a citizen’s 
level of education and her level of trust in municipal government; ceteris paribus, the 
more educated a Colombian, the less trust in municipal government she will have. 
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Alternatively, age is positively correlated with the dependent variable; older citizens 
general have more trust in municipal government than their younger compatriots.  
 The ideology variables are measured in comparison to those respondents who did 
not reply with a valid response (i.e. missing). Therefore, compared to those who do not 
hold (or do not wish to reveal) an ideological position, leftist citizens’ average values are 
about five points lower, holding constant all other variables. On the other end of the 
spectrum, however, citizens placing themselves toward the right of the left/right scale 
hold values that are, on average, four points higher than citizens in the referent category. 
There is no discernible difference between citizen falling into the ideological center and 
Colombians who opted not to self-place on the scale. Compared to respondents whose 
primary occupation is outside of agriculture, landowning farmers hold, on average, levels 
of trust in local government of about 2.5 points lower on the 0 to 100 scales while non-
landowning agricultural workers are not statistically different from the reference group. 
The final dummy variable included in the analysis suggests that women, in comparison to 
me, are, on average, more trust in municipal governments.  
 The relationship between wealth and trust in municipal government is marginally 
negative; wealthier Colombians, in terms of material goods, tend to be less trusting in 
their local governments. Citizens who hold more positive evaluations of the national 
economy also tend to be more trusting in their municipal government. Finally, citizens 
with higher levels of political knowledge are less trust in local governments.  
 Focusing our attention on the contextual variables included in the model, we find 
that ecological variation in terms of macro-poverty, the existence of coffee cultivation in 
the municipality, and homicide levels are not significantly related with the dependent 
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variables. In order to better understand how the presence of the Coffee Federation affects 
citizens’ trust toward municipal government in Colombia, Figure III.5 below presents 
predicted values for different types of municipalities, holding constant all other variables 
except those of immediate interest: FNCC presence, state presence, and the interaction 
between the two. 
 
Figure III.5. Predicted Values of Trust in Municipal Government by Type of Municipality. 95% confidence 
intervals displayed in brackets. 
 
 In order to present the results as efficiently as possible, I have created four types 
of municipalities based on the presence of the Federation and the state. The first bar 
presents the estimated value of trust in municipal government on the 0 to 100 scale for a 
municipality classified as High State/Low Federation (HS/LF) with 95% confidence 
intervals displayed in brackets. The second bar shows the value for Low State/High 
Federation (LS/HF) municipalities while High State/High Federation (HS/HF) follows. 
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The final bar in the figure represents those municipalities that can be considered to have 
low state presence and a low Federation presence (LS/LF).  
 Although much of the variation that exists at first glance is muted once 
confidence intervals are taken into account, there are still important findings to be 
gleaned from this figure. First, the predicted value of the Low State/High Federation 
municipality is significantly higher than the predicted values of the High State/High 
Federation municipality, and more importantly, the Low State/Low Federation 
municipality. Also, while not significant at the .05 level, the difference in values between 
the HS/LF municipality and the HS/HF municipality is significant at the .10 level. 
 
Trust in Departmental Government 
 Examining those individual-level factors that help to explain trust in departmental 
government, it is notable that the results are not as robust as those from the previous 
model, or indeed, from those that follow. Of the level-1 covariate included here, only 
sociotropic evaluations and ideology achieve statistical levels of significance in their 
relation to the dependent variable. In the case of the effect of perceptions of the national 
economy, Colombians who hold more favorable views tend to be more trusting of their 
departmental governments. With respect to ideology, citizens who identify as rightist and 
centrist tend to hold levels of trust about three and four points higher, respectively, 
compared to those who did not offer a valid response to the question. Finally, if the 
confidence threshold is relaxed from .05 to 0.10, compared to Colombians who are not 
employed within the agricultural sector of the economy, both landowning farmers and 
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farm workers (non-landowning) tend to hold lower levels of trust in departmental 
governments.  
 The modest performance of the model extends to the contextual covariates. Aside 
from the high federation variable (which is a constitutive term to the interaction variable 
and unable to be interpreted independent of the state presence variable [Brambor et al. 
2006]) and the interaction term, no other variables achieve statistical significance.  
 
Figure III.6. Predicted Values of Trust in Departmental Government by Type of Municipality. 95% confidence 
intervals displayed in brackets. 
 
 As would be expected, Figure III.6 mirrors the lackluster results from the analysis 
discussed above. A difference of just four points separates the predicted values for HS/LF 
type (52.35 points) and the LS/LF type municipality (56.13) with the predicted value of 
HS/HF falling between the two at 53.91 points. Furthermore, when the 95% confidence 
intervals are accounted for, any difference found between the municipality types 
vanishes. However, if we relax the confidence threshold from 0.5 to 0.10, differences 
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begin to emerge. In particular, the predicted value of the Low State/High Federation 
municipality becomes significantly higher that the values estimated from the High 
State/Low Federation type and the Low State/Low Federation municipality. 
Unfortunately, because of the extreme confidence intervals, even at the 0.10 level, it is 
impossible to make conclusive statements regarding the High State/High Federation 
municipality type.  
 
Trust in National Government 
  The final dependent variable measuring trust examines citizens’ trust in their 
national government. As can be deciphered from the results of the third model presented 
in Table III.5, a number of individual-level independent variables are significantly 
correlated with trust in national government. Age, for example, is a positive predictor of 
trust in the central government; the older one is, the higher her level of trust, holding all 
else constant. Similarly, both sociotropic economic evaluations and political knowledge 
are positively correlated with the dependent variable meaning the higher a Colombian 
falls on either scale, the higher their trust in the national government, on average. Finally, 
as has been the case with the other analyses examined in this section, ideology plays a 
role in explaining trust in the central government; compared to those not offering a valid 
ideological position, leftists are less trusting while rightists tend to be more trusting in the 
national government. This should come as no surprise given that throughout period in 
which this analysis is based (2004-2010) a conservative president, Álvaro Uribe, led the 
Colombian government.  
87 
 
 A citizen’s municipal context also plays a role in explaining his level of trust in 
the national government. Surprisingly, the level of unsatisfied basic needs (UBN) in a 
community is positively correlated with the dependent variable; on average, an increase 
in a municipality’s level of UBN would results in higher levels of trust in the Colombian 
government. More in-line with expectations, however, is the negative relationship 
between a community’s homicide rate and its citizens’ level of trust in the national 
government. To understand how the conditional relationship between state presence and 
Federation presence affects trust in Bogotá, I present the predicted values for each 
municipal type in Figure III.7 below. 
 
Figure III.7. Predicted Values of Trust in National Government by Type of Municipality. 95% confidence 
intervals displayed in brackets. 
 
 Consistent with the results presented explaining trust in municipal and 
departmental governments, the municipality type with the highest estimated level of trust 
in national government in that with a low state presence and a high Federation presence 
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(LS/HF) with 78.92 points on the 0 to 100 scale. The next highest type of municipality, 
High State/Low Federation (HS/LF), with a predicted average of 63.86 is not 
distinguishable from the LS/HF type at the 0.05 level, but does become statistically 
different at the 0.10 level. The same is true between the predicted values for the LS/HF 
municipality and the HG/HF municipality—although not statistically different at the 0.05 
level; they are distinguishable at the 0.10 level. Finally, the difference between the 
average value for the LS/HF municipality type and the Low State/Low Federation 
municipality type is significant at the 0.05 level.  
 
Satisfaction with Local Services  
 The final perception or attitude-based dependent variable that I examine here is 
satisfaction with local services, the results of which are presented in the last column of 
Table III.5. Similar to the previous results discussed above, a number of individual and 
contextual-level factors play a role in explaining citizen satisfaction with the provision of 
local services in Colombia. Beginning with the level-1 covariates, both the female 
variable and the sociotropic evaluation variable are positively correlated with the 
dependent variable. More substantively, we can expect women to hold, on average, levels 
of satisfaction with local services of about two points higher in comparison to men. Also, 
as a Colombian’s evaluation of the national economy improves, so too should her overall 
level in satisfaction with local services ceteris paribus. 
 At the contextual-level, both the level of unsatisfied basic needs and the area of 
land devoted to coffee cultivation assist in explaining individual-level variation in 
satisfaction with local services, albeit from opposite directions. First, a municipality’s 
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level of UBN is negatively associated with the dependent variable signifying that as a 
community’s level of macro-poverty decreases, citizens’ satisfaction with local services 
will tend to increase. Alternatively, the results of this analysis suggest that citizens in 
municipalities that devote higher proportions of land to the cultivation of coffee are, in 
general, more satisfied with the provision of local services in their community.  
 
Figure III.8. Predicted Values of Satisfaction with Local Services by Type of Municipality. 95% confidence 
intervals displayed in brackets. 
 
 The predicted values presented in Figure III.8 show the same pattern that has been 
found throughout this chapter. The Low State/High Federation municipality type leads 
the predicted averages with about 61 points on the 0 to 100 scale while the High 
State/Low Federation municipality follows, yet is statistically indistinguishable. The 
LS/HF municipality type, however, is significantly different from both the High 
State/High Federation and Low State/Low Federation municipality types. While I cannot 
be confident in the differences between the HS/LF municipality type and the HS/HF 
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municipality or the LS/LF municipality at the 0.05 level, we can be confident in such 
differences once I relax the statistical threshold to 0.10.  
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 
 The results of the analyses presented in this chapter not only paint a consistent 
picture in terms of the effect of the National Federation of Colombian Coffee-Growers on 
citizen trust in government and satisfaction with local services, but also on how 
corporatist institutions in 21st Latin America affect citizen attitudes and perceptions. In 
every case, those municipalities with the highest average levels of either trust or 
satisfaction were not those with strong presences of both institutions, but those with one 
strong institutional actor. Indeed, throughout this chapter, it was the low state, high 
Federation group of municipalities that consistently had the highest levels of predicted 
average scores on the 0-100 scale, while contrary to my expectations, the high state/ high 
Federation municipalities have the lowest predicted averages of trust in government and 
satisfaction with local services. 
 Scholars, in American and comparative politics, have convincingly made a causal 
link between specific and diffuse support for democracy. Hetherington (1998) argues that 
decreases in citizen trust can have pernicious effects on democratic attitudes and values 
while Hiskey and Seligson (2003) have demonstrated a link between satisfaction with 
local government and system support. In consolidated and developed democratic systems 
such as the United States, these warnings many not be as dire as in democratic societies 
considered to be fragile or unconsolidated.  
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 If, as Collier and Collier (1979) contend, that governments utilized corporatist 
organizations to serve as buffers between the masses and the government, the results 
presented in this chapter support the argument that this form of state-society relationship 
still exists in 21st century Colombia. Even following the implementation of neo-liberal 
economic policies, and the deepening of democratic processes and procedures including 
decentralization, it is clear from the preceding analyses that the Coffee Federation 
continues to have a great deal of impact on citizens living in those municipalities where 
the FNCC has a large presence.  
 It is apparent that in municipalities where there exists a small government 
presence but a large Federation presence, citizen trust in government and satisfaction 
with local services rivals that found in high state/low Federation municipalities. It is 
plausible and suggested by the results presented above that if the Coffee Federation did 
not maintain the presence that it has in those municipalities considered to be low state/ 
high Federation, trust in government, as well as satisfaction with local services would 
decrease to levels similar to those municipalities considered to low state/low Federation. 
Therefore, it is clear that the government benefits from having the Federation take on a 
more active role and serve as an “alternative government” in these municipalities. It is 
also apparent, that in these municipalities, the Coffee Federation continues to act as a 
typical corporation, supplanting the state where necessary and serving as a buffer 
between the masses and their elected representatives. If the FNCC, a labor organization 
administered by unelected and (vertically) unaccountable officials, is serving to inflate 
citizen trust in and satisfaction with the government, might this affect how citizens act 
within the political realm of democratic governance? Might these buffers that exist 
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between citizens and the state affect participation in traditional and nontraditional modes 
of political behavior? Chapter IV of this dissertation examines these questions. 
 The second significant finding from this chapter is one that was unexpected. In 
situations where the state and the FNCC have strong presences I expected citizens to be 
most trusting in government and satisfied with local services. This was because in these 
municipalities the state would be the primary provider of public goods with the 
Federation serving in a complementary role. However, the results presented above 
suggest that Colombians in HS/HF municipalities are, on average, the least trusting in 
government and the least satisfied with the provision of local services in their 
municipalities. Although the wide confidence intervals associated with these results 
should give caution to any conclusions made, I can at least be somewhat comforted by 
consistency found throughout the analyses estimated in this chapter; indeed, the estimated 
values for HS/HF municipalities in all the models presented above are the lowest among 
the four types of municipalities included in the typology. These results suggest that 
instead of complementing each other in HS/HF municipalities, the relationship between 
the state and the FNCC is more complicated with a significant competitive dynamic. This 
is a topic to which I will return in Chapter V.  
 The primary purpose of this dissertation is to understand the effects of sub-
national state-society relations on citizens’ attitudes and behaviors. In this particular 
chapter, I seek to explain how the municipal presence of Colombia’s Coffee Federation 
systematically affects citizens’ trust in government and satisfaction with local services. 
Consistent with the theoretical discussion, the analyses presented here show that 
Colombians living in municipalities with one strong institutional actor tend to have the 
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highest levels of trust in government and satisfaction with the services being provided in 
their communities. Alternatively, in municipalities with a strong presence of both the 
state and FNCC, trust and satisfaction rival levels found in municipalities lacking a strong 
institutional presence. 
 Even as Colombia has decentralized, implemented neo-liberal economic policies 
and invested in the deepening of democratic processes and procedures while the FNCC 
has suffered greatly in terms of financial health in recent year, it is clear from the above 
analyses that this organization still plays a significant role in shaping citizen attitudes and 
perceptions across sub-national Colombia. In the following chapter, I will examine to 
what extent this presence affects actual behaviors by the masses in the political realm.  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
 
THE EFFECTS OF THE FNCC ON CONVENTIONAL AND 
UNCONVENTIONAL POLITICAL BEHAVIORS 
 
  
 
 Since the region’s independence from the Spanish crown in the 19th century, and 
indeed before, political participation throughout Latin America has been a risky and 
perhaps even deadly decision. The latter half of the 20th century was especially brutal for 
those who chose to participate politically in countries where the second wave of 
democratization had receded and dictatorships and military regimes had taken hold. In 
countries such as Argentina, Chile, Brazil, and Peru, those who dared participate or 
partake in political activities deemed unacceptable by the relevant political elite faced 
harassment, imprisonment, or death. However, as alternatives to participating directly in 
the country’s political life, many governments throughout the region created or supported 
the creation of organizations that would serve as buffers between citizens and 
governments and would allow citizens to “participate politically through state-approved, 
carefully regulated associations” (Erickson 1977, 2). In many instances, these groups 
were organized around democratic principles where members would have the opportunity 
to elect leadership, engage in public debate and compete for organizational leadership 
positions. Although these corporations or corporatist institutions were seen by many to be 
incompatible and unsustainable with the stated values and goals of both democratization 
and free-market economic systems, contemporary scholarship has demonstrated that like 
many pre-dual transition institutions, corporatism has not only survived, but evolved so 
as to remain a critical part of state-society relations in the region. 
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 Colombia, of course, does not fit neatly within the experiences of the countries 
listed above. Aside from a couple brief periods of military rule in the 20th century, the 
republican-era of the Colombian state has been considered at least nominally democratic 
with the administration of regular and planned elections. However, Colombia has faced 
its own unique set of problems that has made many modes of not only political 
participation, but also political identification, deadly endeavors that the state has sought 
to deemphasize. As Robert Dix (1980) aptly notes, different from most consociational 
arrangements, the one found in Colombia was particularly unique: 
[I]ts subcultures are not ethnically, religiously or even class based. […] 
Colombia’s subcultures have maintained the intense and deep-seated 
loyalties to the two historic parties— so intense and deep-seated, in fact, 
that they have been called the ‘hereditary hatreds’ and were substantially 
responsible for the loss of more than 100,000 lives in a quasi-civil war that 
raged among Liberal and Conservative partisans in the Colombian 
countryside for more than a decade beginning in the late 1940s. (Dix 1980, 
304).  
 
Given that much of the violence described by Dix occurred in the regions of the 
country where coffee cultivation is a primary economic activity, and as a result, the 
Coffee Federation has a high presence, I argue in this chapter that the FNCC, while 
understated, played an important role in halting the political violence of the 1940s. The 
effects of these activities are still felt to this day throughout many municipalities with a 
significant Federation presence.  
 To demonstrate not only the important role of the FNCC during the years of 
consociational governance but the continuing legacy of that involvement, I divide this 
chapter into five sections. The first section briefly chronicles the contemporary history of 
political violence and political participation in the country and considers the role of the 
FNCC during the country’s most recent violent experiences. Section two considers past 
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scholarship on municipal effects on political and civic behavior while section three 
develops a theory of how the FNCC should affect citizens’ political behaviors. Section 
four discusses the empirical strategy and presents the results. Section five offers a 
discussion and finally concludes.  
 
The Perils of Political Participation in Colombia 
 
 Throughout the 20th century and into the 21st in Colombia, violence and politics 
have become so intertwined that it is nearly impossible to know where one ends and the 
other begins. Scholars have attributed the intense political conflict to as far back as the 
selection of the country’s first president and vice-president, “The basic tale of party 
formation in Colombia is that the two traditional parties emerged from the political 
conflicts of two of the country’s early leaders, with the Conservative Party emerging 
from Simón Bolívar and the Liberal Party from Francisco de Paula Santander” (Taylor 
2009, 61). These partisan conflicts persisted and developed throughout the 19th century, 
culminating to the infamous Thousand Days War beginning in 1899. Although records 
and historical accounts of the three-year war are sparse, historians estimate that roughly 
100,000 Colombians were killed and many more displaced (Bushnell 2010, 35). 
Furthermore, as was discussed in chapter two, Colombian society and economic activities 
were all but decimated during this conflict.  
 Although Colombians worked hard to rebuild their economy and society, the 
country was once again thrust into civil war following the assassination of the Liberal 
Party’s presidential candidate Jorge Gaitán in 1948 which sparked a period of intense 
97 
 
chaos and violence in Bogotá leading to the more prolonged and sustained partisan war 
known as La Violencia between 1948 and 1958.  
 As was the case during the Thousand Days War, the areas of the country that saw 
the most violence were rural and the victims primarily peasants and of the agrarian class. 
Indeed, some of the most severely affected areas of the country were the primary coffee 
growing regions in the south-central part of Colombia; the area that today makes up the 
departments of Caldas, Risaralda, and Quindío, also known as viejo or antiguo Caldas.1 
The decade-long conflict resulted in an estimated 300,000 lives lost and many more 
displaced. Colombians in the affected zones were forced to flee their homesteads and 
farming land, in many cases, never to return (Palacios 2006, 136). It was also in response 
to this time period of prolonged violence that Colombia’s only modern-day military 
regime took power with broad support of the populace. Placed within the context of Latin 
America, the military regime that governed Colombia between 1953 and 1958 was rather 
tame and insignificant; however, it served as a catalyst for the creation of an institutional 
arrangement that would be felt throughout Colombia until the ratification of a new 
constitution in 1991. 
 In an effort to regain political control from General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, the two 
parties in Colombia instituted a power-sharing agreement that culminated into the 
National Front (Frente Nacional) which called for alternation of key political positions 
(including the presidency) as well as party parity on government agencies, committees, 
                                                        
1 Oscar Arango Gaviria (Professor of Sociology, Universidad Tecnológica de Pereira and Director of 
Regional Development, Red Alma Mater) in discussion with the author, July 2011. 
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and boards.2 It should be noted that while the FNCC’s National Committee was not 
technically mandated to follow these provisions, it did adhere to the National Front by 
ensuring an equal number of Liberal Party and Conservative Party members between 
1958 and 1974. Occupants of the office of the president alternated as mandated by the 
agreement until its scheduled end in 1974; however, many other positions and 
government bodies adhered to the agreement until the ratification of the new constitution 
in 1991.  
 Aside from the alternating of power between the two political parties, a primary 
goal of the National Front was to eliminate the political violence occurring in the country 
which essentially (yet unexpectedly) called for a reduction in political participation and a 
de-emphasis of party identification among the masses, “[…] one of the intentions of the 
National Front system was to demobilize the mass following of the traditional parties, 
diffusing the conflict between them” (Hartlyn 1986, 160).  Even with the ratification of a 
constitution in 1991 that was aimed at ridding the country of what was left of the 
National Front and whose explicit mission was to increase political participation among 
all sectors of the populace, Colombia still has some of the lowest rates of traditional 
modes of political participation. 
 As mass political participation in Colombia decreased throughout the 1960s and 
70s, the political, economic, and social influence of the coffee industry and the FNCC 
were increasing. Indeed, it was in regions of the country most affected by the political 
violence where the FNCC was (and continues to be) most active. Through the application 
of arguments developed by Erickson, Malloy, and others, it is plausible that the FNCC 
                                                        
2 Aside from the requirement of parity and alternation the National Front arrangement also called for other 
institutional changes including a majority two-thirds vote in Congress on all legislation (this requirement 
was eventually eased). For more information on the development of the National Front, see Hartlyn (1988).  
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served as an acceptable alternative institution where citizens could exercise democratic 
behaviors and expect a reasonable amount of transparency from the organization’s 
leadership. After all, since its development in the early 20th century, the FNCC has relied 
on contemporary democratic principles to select leaders and establish institution policy. 
Unfortunately, data from this time do not exist to test the notion that participation in the 
FNCC increased during the years of the National Front; however, it is without question 
that during this time the stature and influence of the organization within Colombian 
society and politics greatly increased. In this chapter, I argue that even as the fiscal 
condition of the Federation is challenged, the organization continues to influence mass 
political behaviors in those municipalities where it has the largest presence, conditional to 
that of the state.  
 
The Contextual Connection: Municipal Effects on Political and Civic Behavior 
 
The recognition that ecological conditions in which a person finds herself may 
affect her propensity to act or behave in one way or another is not a new idea in political 
science. Indeed, since the field’s behavioral revolution in the 1950s, students of political 
science have been engaged in understanding how context affects political attitudes and 
behaviors. Most notably, in comparative politics, Almond and Verba’s (1963) seminal 
work on civic culture contends, at least implicitly, that national-level conditions affect 
individual level attributes related to democratic development and modernization. 
Although much of the work examining mass behaviors has looked at the 
phenomenon from a national or cross-national perspective, it would be inaccurate to 
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conclude that researchers have only shown interest at this level of analysis. Indeed, years 
before Almond and Verba published their study on civic culture in five countries, the US 
Congress commissioned a study to understand civic participation in US municipalities 
following the second World War. However, because of data and methodological 
limitations, many of the early studies examining the ecological effects on citizen behavior 
were almost exclusively case study or ethnographic analyses. Furthermore, for similar 
reasons, these studies tended to focus on economic effects on civic engagement and 
community welfare across US communities or counties. For example, in a study 
commissioned by the US Senate, Goldschmidt (1947) finds that citizens residing in 
communities with high concentrations of large farming enterprises typically have low 
standards of living and less opportunities for civic engagement than citizens living in 
rural communities with higher concentrations of small, independently operated farming 
operations. Similarly, in a separate study commissioned by the US Congress, Mills and 
Ulmer (1970 [1946]) conclude that “big business tends to depress while small business 
tends to raise the level of civic welfare” (p. 124) in US communities. Like Goldschmidt, 
these researchers are concerned with the level of economic concentration in US localities, 
yet different from the previous study discussed, Mills and Ulmer utilize aggregated 
sources of data to examine the effect in six (unnamed) American cities.  
 As social science methodologies advanced, so too did studies seeking to explain 
effects of local context on political and civic engagement. Using a combination of survey 
and census data, Huckfeldt (1977) finds that at least in the case of Buffalo, New York, 
“neighborhood social context has an important effect upon the extent of individual 
political activity and the degree to which participation is structured by individual status” 
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(p. 579). Although this study looked at neighborhoods in only one city, later work by 
Huckfeldt extended his analyses to areas in both Buffalo and Detroit, Michigan where he 
argues that “neighborhood social contexts have important political consequences, not 
only for individual behavior, but also for the political vitality of groups in the political 
process” (Huckfeldt 1986, 11). 
 It was not until the last 10-15 years when students of American political behavior 
and sociology began to apply large-N, comparative methodologies to inquiries of 
municipal or community effect on individual-level behaviors. Using a dataset of over 
1,600 respondents, nested in municipalities, Oliver (1999) finds evidence that macro-
economic conditions affect local civic participation in two distinct ways, “First affluent 
cities have fewer social ‘needs’ prompting citizen actions. Second heterogeneous cities 
have more competitions for public good which stimulates citizen interest and 
participation (Oliver 1999, 186). As a result, in those areas with more heterogeneous 
populations, local participation tends to be higher. Additionally, continuing the research 
agendas put forth by Mills, Ulmer, and Goldschmidt over a half a century ago, 
contemporary sociologists, using large-N methodologies have arrived mostly at similar 
conclusions regarding the effects of local economic concentration (Troy and Matthew 
2006) and scales of agricultural production (Lyson et al. 2001) on civic behavior and 
community welfare.  
 Just as researchers focusing on the American case have long been interested in 
subnational conditions on individual-level behaviors so too have students of other parts of 
the world. Particularly in the region of Latin America, political scientists and sociologists 
have been, until recently, hampered by a dearth of appropriate data with which to conduct 
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quantitative analyses. However, in the run-up to the historic presidential election in 
Mexico in 2000, Hiskey and Bowler (2005) find that local political context played a 
significant role in individuals’ evaluations of legitimacy of the system and as a result, 
“Citizens are more willing to participate in politics when they think the process is fair, 
and direct evidence of the fairness of the system is provided by the local political context” 
(Hiskey and Bowler 2005, 57). Finally, in a study of voting behavior in contemporary 
Colombia, Miguel García finds that: 
The territorial consolidation of right wing paramilitaries significantly 
reduced the individual probability of voting; yet, citizens living in 
contested areas exhibited the lowest probability of participating in local 
elections. Violent contexts also had a tremendous influence on vote 
intention. In fact, going from areas dominated by left wing insurgents to 
regions controlled by right wing paramilitary groups, citizens were more 
likely to support a presidential candidate located on the right of the 
ideological spectrum. (García 2009, 142).  
 
 Previous studies examining local context on citizen behaviors have included a 
diverse range of ecological factors as key independent variables including economic 
segregation and concentration, political factors, and levels of violence, however, no study 
exists that considers how local state-society relations and non-state actors might affect 
individual political behaviors. Using the FNCC and its presence in Colombian 
municipalities relative to the strength of the state, in the following pages of this chapter, I 
analyze the effects of these, until now, omitted variables. The next section puts forward a 
theory and testable hypotheses of state-society relations and 21st century corporatism’s 
effect on political behaviors in modern day Colombia. 
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The National Coffee Federation and Political Behavior 
 
 Active participation in civil society organizations has been viewed as an essential 
component to the democratic (and participatory) development of society since 
Tocqueville noted the robust associational culture in 19th century United States. In his 
seminal works on institutional (1983) and democratic (1993) development in Italy, 
Putnam attributes robust civil society to the significant advances found in the northern 
regions of the country and the lack of such a civic tradition to the disappointing progress 
in the southern regions. By participating in even non-political institutions, citizens have 
the potential to gain invaluable skills that will assist them in the political realm. Verba, et 
al. (1995) argue that participation in such organizations allow for “informal political 
discussions” as well as inadvertently exposing citizens to political dialogue. Also, “on the 
job, in church, or in organizations, individuals develop networks of friends and 
acquaintances from which requests for political involvement emerge” (Verba, et al. 1995, 
309). In short, participating in civic life has long been seen as a gateway into political and 
democratic participation, at least in the American and European contexts.   
 The benefits of civil society on both a country’s citizenry and democracy itself are 
numerous. According to Putnam, civil society and voluntary organizations serve as 
venues in which individual citizens whose voice would otherwise be ignored, can come 
together and “express their interests and demands on government and… protect 
themselves from abuses of power by their political leaders” (Putnam 2000, 338). Civic 
and voluntary associations also serve as ‘schools of democracy’ according to Putnam and 
others. Pateman writes that “…for a democratic polity to exist it is necessary for a 
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participatory society to exist, i.e. a society where all political systems have been 
democratised and socialisation through participation can take place in all areas” (Pateman 
1970, 41). Indeed, from the discussion above, the relationship is clear, for a democracy to 
take hold and become a reliable and stable regime, a robust, active and democratic civic 
society must parallel the formal, state democratic structure. 
 In more recent years, however, scholars have recognized possible negative effects 
of civil society on democratic processes and outcomes (but see Putnam’s discussion of 
“exceptional” organizations [2000]). A more systematic ‘dark side’ of civil society has 
the potential for creating inequalities within the democratic process and making some 
groups more powerful than others (Fiorina 1999). In fact, Armony notes, “civic 
involvement may… be linked to undemocratic outcomes inimical to democracy, or it 
may contribute to such results” (2006, 56-57). Finally, for civil society to contribute to a 
robust democratic regime, it must first be free from state intervention, “a country without 
a multitude of organizations relatively independent of the central state power has a high 
dictatorial as well as revolutionary potential” (Lipset 1981, 52).  
 In those municipalities where it has an official presence, the Coffee Federation 
provides numerous opportunities for its members to associate, participate, and engage 
with the organization and community. From regularly scheduled Federation meetings 
organized by the local staff, to the opportunity to elect representatives for various FNCC 
posts, or to even compete for such a position, it would seem that the FNCC would fit 
nicely into the “school of democracy” model developed and advocated by Pateman, 
Verba et al. and others. However, there are important caveats that much be considered. 
First, participation within the FNCC is not a right or privilege open to all Colombians but 
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only to those who meet specific requirements such as owning land, producing a requisite 
amount of coffee, and possessing a cedula cafetera. Furthermore, the Coffee Federation 
is not independent from the Colombian government, financially or otherwise. Indeed 
since the collapse of the International Coffee Agreement and the onset of the coffee crisis, 
the national government has heavily subsidized the organization with the understanding 
that this assistance will likely continue for the medium to long term.3 Finally, in many 
ways the FNCC does not function as a typical civil society organization as much as an 
alternative government. 
 While it is plausible that this institution could affect how citizens behave 
politically, it is not entirely apparent how. Thirty years ago, when Colombia was under 
the institutional arrangement of the National Front and a primary objective of the 
government was to reduce or eliminate violent political behavior, the corporatist FNCC 
had a clear role to play, a buffer between the masses and the state. However, since 1991 
and the ratification of a new constitution, the Colombian state has both altered and 
created institutions to encourage traditional forms of political participation. For example, 
mayors and governors are now popularly elected instead of appointed and representation 
to the national legislature is selected using proportional allocation of seats instead of a 
majoritarian approach. The last point is at least partially responsible for the implosion of 
the traditional party system in Colombia and the disruption of the two-party dominance in 
national politics (Dargent and Muñoz 2011).  
 
 
                                                        
3 4 August 2012. “La locomotora del café salió del taller.” Semana. 
http://www.semana.com/economia/articulo/la-locomotra-del-cafe-salio-del-taller/262405-3 (accessed 14 
February 2013). 
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How Corporatism Affects Behavior in 21st Century Latin America 
If corporatist organizations and institutions in Latin America were created to 
benefit the governments of the time, they have survived and remained relevant actors into 
the 21st century for the same reason. The difference, however, are the types of 
governments to whom they are benefitting; throughout much of the 20th century, these 
governments were often time authoritarian, autocratic, or at most, nominally democratic 
and their primary interest in terms of corporatism was diverting mass opinion and 
behaviors from the state into these approved organizations. Today, however, the situation 
is quite different. Essentially all countries in the region can be considered to meet at least 
the minimal definition of democracy put forward by Schumpeter (1942) and in many 
societies, Colombia included, recent years have seen improvements in democratic 
processes, human rights, and social accountability. Furthermore, no longer are citizens 
discouraged or prohibited from interacting with the state and political institutions, but 
indeed, are encouraged to do so. Therefore, if citizens are no longer being “funneled” into 
corporations in order to remove them from the political realm, what role does corporatism 
play in 21st century Latin America? 
 It is now the responsibility of corporatist organizations, who continue to be both 
constrained by and beneficiaries of the state to assist in areas where the government may 
be lacking. In Colombia, and more specifically the FNCC, this includes the actual 
provision of basic services, the creation and maintenance of infrastructure, and the 
education of the country’s youth in many municipalities where state presence may be 
lacking or effectively absent. In the previous chapter, I show that in municipalities where 
the state has a less than ideal presence, it relies upon the Coffee Federation to provide a 
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source of legitimacy among the municipalities’ residents from which it can benefit. 
Indeed, among the variables analyzed, municipalities with a higher than average Coffee 
Federation presence but low state presence consistently held higher levels of trust in 
government and were more satisfied with the provision of local services than were 
residents in municipalities with low FNCC presence and low state presence. In this 
scenario, it is because of the FNCC that residents in the LS/HF municipalities hold higher 
levels of trust and satisfaction than their compatriots living in LS/LF municipalities. 
Clearly, at least in terms of mass perceptions and attitudes, the FNCC, at the municipal 
level, has a clear effect; however, how might this ecological condition affect 21st century 
political behavior, both conventional and unconventional? 
 In terms of the effects of the Coffee Federation on actual political behaviors 
among the Colombian citizenry, I expect the relationship to be similar to that which was 
discussed in chapter two regarding political attitudes and perceptions, at least as it relates 
to conventional modes of participation. In general, I hypothesize that in municipalities 
where the state may have a less than ideal presence it will rely on the FNCC to lend it 
support and legitimacy. Further, the FNCC’s focus on civic engagement and activity in 
low state/high Federation municipalities will encourage citizens in these municipalities to 
be, in general, more engaged and active in the political process than citizens in 
municipalities where there is a low presence of both institutions. Indeed, given my 
expectations that in LS/HF municipalities the FNCC will effectively serve to substitute 
the government, I anticipate that the probability of a citizen participating in conventional 
political behaviors will be similar to those in HS/LF municipalities where the government 
is the legitimate provider of public goods and services and has a real and noticeable 
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presence in the city or town. Furthermore, consistent with its traditional corporatist role, 
but in an era of electoral democracy, the FNCC, just as it lends legitimacy to the state, 
will also serve to increase participation in conventional political behavior in 
municipalities where it serves to supplant the state. I expect that the likelihood of an 
individual in a LS/HF municipality of participating in conventional modes of behavior to 
be at least equal to that of a similar individual in a HS/LF municipality and significantly 
higher than in LS/LF municipalities.  
 In municipalities where the state and the FNCC have high presences (HS/HF), the 
Federation, instead of acting as an “alternative government” will act primarily as a 
standard civic society organization. In these municipalities, it will function as a school of 
democracy where citizens who participate in the local coffee committees by speaking 
with and petitioning representatives, attending Federation meetings, and voting in FNCC 
elections should also partake in these activities with regard to the government and 
political life. Therefore, in HS/HF municipalities, I expect the probability of participating 
in conventional political behaviors to be among the highest found in comparison to the 
other types of municipalities in this analysis.   
 However, participation in unconventional modes of political activity should vary 
differently than those activities considered conventional. In addition to the traditional 
corporatist responsibility of funneling citizens away from political participation, it was 
also the responsibility of corporations to ensure that citizens did not engage in behaviors 
that had the potential to undermine the government or political elites (Malloy 1974; 
1977). In many Latin American countries throughout the latter half of the 20th century, a 
key responsibility bestowed onto corporations by governments was to limit participation 
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in non-sanctioned protests or demonstrations. Although in the case of Colombia and the 
FNCC reliable data do not exist to examine how effective this organization was at stifling 
protest in coffee municipalities in the 1960s or 70s, it is possible to examine whether 
there exists a relationship between the organization’s presence in a municipality and 
citizens’ propensity to demonstrate.  
 Results from previous analyses suggest that having the FNCC in a municipality 
where there is low state presence benefits the state in key ways as citizens are more 
trusting of all levels of government, more satisfied with basic services, and more likely to 
participate in conventional political behaviors. If, as I have argued above the Federation 
continues as a corporatist organization into the 21st century then in addition to promoting 
attitudes and behaviors that are beneficial to the current regime, it should also discourage 
behaviors that would be less than desirable for the Colombian government. Therefore, in 
municipalities where the there is a significant Coffee presence, I expect the likelihood of 
citizen participation in unconventional modes of political participation to be less than in 
municipalities where the presence of the FNCC is either low or non-existent.  
 
Political Behavior in Colombian Municipalities 
 
 Until relatively recently, political science has tended to accept a rather constrained 
definition of political behavior and participation. Attributed mostly to Verba and Nie’s 
(1972, participation was typically defined as “behavior to affect the choice of 
governmental personnel and/or policies” through conventional means such as voting, 
participation in political parties, and interacting with elected officials by attending 
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meetings or writing letters. However, beyond the borders of the United States (and even 
within them), scholars quickly recognized this definition as being “too narrow” and 
lacking in regards to recognizing important modes of behavior in diverse cultural 
settings.4 In the case of political participation in Latin America, scholars such as Booth 
and Seligson (1978; Seligson and Booth 1979) identified the inadequacy of only 
examining political participation through a conventional lens, “Such a narrow 
definition… has artificially constrained analysis, directing it away from many other kinds 
of activity of political importance” (Booth and Seligson 1978, 4). Indeed, while Booth 
and Seligson’s definition of political participation as “behaviors influencing or attempting 
to influence the distribution of public goods” (ibid, 6) might not on its face appear 
drastically different from the one put forward by Verba and Nie, the fact that they 
explicitly include non-conventional forms of behavior is truly a point of departure from 
previous conceptualizations.5  
 
Measuring and Explaining Conventional Political Behavior 
 The distinction between conventional and non-conventional forms of political 
participation is an important one when assessing the impact or corporatism and 
corporatist organization on mass behaviors. A primary motivation for the creation and 
continued support of corporations throughout much of the 20th century by Latin 
American governments was to limit or prevent mass participation in protest, 
demonstrations, acts of political violence, and other types of behaviors that would be 
                                                        
4 see Conge (1988) 
5 Important to mention that Booth and Seligson were not the only scholars advocating a more inclusive 
definition of political participation. For a broader discussion on the topic, see Booth and Seligson (1978) 
and Conge (1988).  
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considered unconventional. Additionally, as posited here, it is also fathomable that the 
continued presence of corporatism into the 21st century may affect participation in 
conventional modes of political behavior differently than in unconventional forms. 
Taking these realities into account, in this analysis I will consider both conventional and 
unconventional types of political participation. For those considered conventional, I will 
look at voting behavior, party identification, petitioning local and national officials, 
working (or volunteering) for a political campaign, speaking about politics with others, 
and attending municipal meetings. Figure IV.1 below presents the proportion of residents 
for each municipality included in the dataset between 2004 and 2010 that reported 
engaging in each activity
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Figure IV.1. Percentage of respondents voting in last presidential      
election by municipality, 2004-2010 
Figure IV.2 Percentage of respondents identifying with a political 
party by municipality, 2004-2010 
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Figure IV.3. Percentage of respondents petitioning the government 
by municipality, 2004-2010 
 
Figure IV.4. Percentage of respondents attending municipal 
meetings by municipality, 2005-2010 
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Figure IV.5. Percentage of respondents who attempt to convince 
others by municipality, 2005-2010 
Figure IV.6. Percentage of respondents who worked for a political 
party or candidate by municipality, 2004-2010 
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 Using data from up to seven rounds of nationally representative surveys in 
Colombia conducted by LAPOP, it is clear that at least at the aggregate level, significant 
variation of conventional behavior exists between municipalities in Colombia. Indeed, 
even with the most conventional of political behaviors, voting, there exist large 
differences among the municipalities included in the dataset. Figure IV.1 presents the 
percentage of respondents who reported having voted in the previous presidential election 
between 2004 and 2010. Of the 50 municipalities for which data is available, in 14 the 
percentage of respondents who reported having had voted exceeded 70% while in three 
municipalities, Florencia (Caquetá), Soledad (Atlántico), and Soacha (Cundinamarca), 
that percentage was equal to or below 50%.  
 Indeed, similar if not more significant variation exists between municipalities for 
other conventional forms of political participation. When asked whether they identified 
with a political party, 53.3% of respondents in Montería (Córdoba) reported doing so 
while only about 15% in Marinilla (Antioquia) answered yes. These proportions are 
similar to those regarding petitioning government officials between 2004 and 2010; about 
60% of respondents in Rosas (Cauca) reported having done so while just over 10% in 
Bucaramanga (Santander) answered in the affirmative. When asked whether they had 
attended a municipal meeting in the last 12 months (Figure IV.4), 0% of respondents in 
Soacha (Cundinamarca) said they had, while over 38% of respondents in Ibagué (Tolima) 
reported having done so; interestingly, the municipality with the next highest percentage 
of respondents reporting having attended a municipal meeting is Quinchía (Risaralda) at 
18.5%. The final two forms of conventional political behavior that will be examined in 
this chapter are discussing politics with other (Figure IV.5) and working or volunteering 
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for a candidate or party during an election (Figure IV.6). In both cases, the percentage of 
respondents who reported having engaged in the respective behavior ranges from a high 
of about 25% to a low of less than 6%. 
 While the data presented in the above figures are interesting in and of themselves, 
the analytical leverage that can be attained from them is limited at best. First, Figures 
IV.1-IV.6 combine responses from up to seven distinct survey rounds ranging from 2004 
to 2010.  Also, as was mentioned above, these descriptive results come from complex 
surveys whose representativeness does not extend down to the municipal level; therefore, 
it would be inaccurate to claim with any precision or confidence that the figures above 
are accurate descriptions of aggregate municipal behavior. However, through multi-
variate, hierarchical analysis, it is possible to, while holding individual level factors 
constant, understand the impact of contextual conditions on political behaviors. Of course, 
for this particular study, I am interested in understating how state-society relations at the 
municipal level affect the propensity of an individual to participate (or not) in political 
life. Table IV.1 below presents the results of non-linear hierarchical regression analyses 
estimating simultaneously the effects of both contextual and individual-level co-variates 
on the individual-level dependent variables while holding constant the survey year. 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Vote Party Identification Petition Talk about Politics Work for 
Campaign 
Attend Municipal 
Meeting 
       
Constant -1.9592*** 
(0.2393) 
-4.3208*** 
(0.3348) 
-2.4759 
(0.2614) 
-2.7127*** 
(0.2673) 
-4.6202*** 
(0.3146) 
-5.0779*** 
(0.4972) 
Contextual Level 
Variables 
      
FNCC Presence 3.8342 
(2.9092) 
2.8686 
(4.0747) 
6.1409^ 
(3.2568) 
4.5400 
(3.3666) 
8.1224* 
(3.4693) 
13.5779* 
(6.0191) 
State Presence 0.0839* 
(0.0351) 
0.1428** 
(0.0483) 
-0.0263 
(0.0406) 
0.0551 
(0.0411) 
0.1028* 
(0.0434) 
-0.0477 
(0.0739) 
FNCC*State  -0.7753 
(1.0759) 
-1.0201 
(1.4497) 
-1.6205 
(1.1782) 
-1.5657 
(1.2137) 
-2.6607*
(1.2413) 
-4.4066* 
(2.1107) 
UBN 0.0055** 
(0.0020) 
0.0150*** 
(0.0026) 
0.0106*** 
(0.0023) 
0.0046* 
(0.0023) 
0.0123*** 
(0.0024) 
0.0097* 
(0.0041) 
Coffee Area 0.0063 
(0.0082) 
0.0033 
(0.0099) 
0.0107 
(0.0087) 
0.0017 
(0.0087) 
0.0009 
(0.0096) 
-0.0155 
(0.0162) 
Homicide Rate 0.0003 
(0.0018) 
-0.0052* 
(0.0023) 
0.0061** 
(0.0020) 
0.0045* 
(0.0020) 
0.0029 
(0.0022) 
0.0154 
(0.0037) 
Individual Level Variables       
Education 0.2517*** 
(0.0527) 
0.2477*** 
(0.0719) 
0.2796*** 
(0.0528) 
0.2227*** 
(0.0548) 
0.3666*** 
(0.0650) 
0.3692*** 
(0.0951) 
Age 0.4626*** 
(0.0277) 
0.3697*** 
(0.0334) 
0.1808*** 
(0.0252) 
0.0985*** 
(0.0260) 
0.1867*** 
(0.0312) 
0.1646*** 
(0.0421) 
Leftist Ideology 0.0759 
(0.1159) 
0.8719*** 
(0.1617) 
0.5077*** 
(0.1232) 
0.7120*** 
(0.1313) 
0.5391** 
(0.1703) 
0.7545*** 
(0.2080) 
Centrist Ideology 0.0890 
(0.0987) 
0.3825** 
(0.1449) 
0.3292** 
(0.1069) 
0.4525*** 
(0.1163) 
0.4935*** 
(0.1494) 
0.2043 
(0.1904) 
Rightest Ideology 0.1808^
(0.0936) 
0.8756*** 
(0.1360) 
0.5033*** 
(0.0996) 
0.7055*** 
(0.1097) 
0.8478*** 
(0.1399) 
0.5744*** 
(0.1758) 
Agricultor -0.0508 
(0.0988) 
-0.0928 
(0.1282) 
-0.1940^ 
(0.1050) 
-0.0435 
(0.1055) 
0.0355 
(0.1271) 
-0.0725 
(0.1688) 
Peon 0.3164* 
(0.1529) 
0.3863* 
(0.1792) 
0.2053 
(0.1417) 
0.0286 
(0.1501) 
0.0122 
(0.1825) 
0.1575 
(0.2336) 
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Female 0.0651 
(0.0673) 
-0.3508*** 
(0.0901) 
0.0124 
(0.0684) 
-0.3663*** 
(0.0715) 
-0.2399** 
(0.0867) 
-0.3693** 
(0.1182) 
Wealth 0.0327 
(0.0245) 
0.0651* 
(0.03316) 
-0.1105*** 
(0.0251) 
-0.0027 
(0.0255) 
0.0610* 
(0.0299) 
0.0370 
(0.0438) 
Sociotropic Evaluation 0.0013 
(0.0016) 
0.0002 
(0.0021) 
-0.0020 
(0.0016) 
0.0016 
(0.0017) 
-0.0002 
(0.0020) 
0.0021 
(0.0027) 
Political Knowledge 0.0036** 
(0.0012) 
 
0.0094*** 
(0.0017) 
0.0014 
(0.0013) 
0.0010 
(0.0013) 
0.0014 
(0.0016) 
0.0045* 
(0.0022) 
       
N obs individual level (1) 5011 3,054 5,036 5,012 4,925 4,014 
N obs municipal level (2) 323 231 323 323 323 277 
N obs year level (3) 7 5 7 7 7 6 
Log likelihood -2979.01 -1731.74 -2976.64 -2804.01 -2047.00 -1,272.83 
       
Table IV.1. Results of hierarchical non-linear (logit) models. Standard errors in parentheses. ^p>.1 *p>.05 **p>.01
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Although it is difficult to interpret the substantive effects of the co-variates on the 
individual dependent variables in the table above, it is possible to arrive at some 
important conclusions from Table IV.1. First, by just glancing at the significance levels, 
it is apparent, in general, individual-level factors such as a person’s level of education, 
age, and sex tend to be more robust predictors of political participation that do municipal-
level factors, including the variables of interest for this particular project. Indeed, of the 
six forms of conventional political behaviors analyzed in this chapter, only for two, 
working for a candidate or political party and attending municipal meetings, does the 
conditional measure of Federation influence have a notable effect. 
 In terms of statistical significance, the results presented above, for the most part, 
fail to make a strong case in support for the FNCC’s effect on conventional forms of 
political participation; however, there is other information that can be gleaned from Table 
IV.1. Indeed, in four of the six hierarchical logistic regression analyses conducted, the 
results for both the constitutive variables and the interaction, are, while not always 
significant, in the expected theoretical direction and consistent with the results from 
Chapter III. As was the case in the previous chapter, the results presented above suggest 
that a higher average Federation presence will have a negative moderating effect on 
various forms of individual-level political participation, especially as the presence of the 
state increases in a municipality. Furthermore, in three of the six analyses displayed 
above, in those municipalities where the Coffee Federation does not have an official 
presence (i.e. FNCC presence=0), the state presence variable has a positive and 
significant effect. In other words, as state presence increases in a municipality, so too 
does the likelihood that citizens will have voted (at the .10 level), identified with a 
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political party, and worked for a campaign. Similarly, the Coffee Federation has a 
positive and significant independent effect on having signed a petition, worked for a 
campaign, and attended a municipal meeting. However, given that no municipality in the 
dataset is completely lacking of state presence, the significance of this result is theoretical 
(Kam and Franzese 2007).   
 Among the contextual-level variables, there are others that also play a significant 
role in explaining individual-level political participation. For example, in municipalities 
where unsatisfied basic needs are higher (i.e. higher levels of macro-poverty), individuals 
are more likely, on average to have participated in all six forms of political participation 
analyzed in this chapter than are Colombians in more affluent communities. Finally, 
although a municipality’s homicide rate is a negative predictor for party identification, it 
is a positive predictor in explaining whether a citizen has signed a petition or reports 
speaking about politics with their friends and neighbors.  
 The effects of the individual-level predictors are, in general, consistent with 
extant scholarship on political behavior. The standard demographic variables such as 
education, age, and sex are significant predictors of various political behaviors. For age 
and education, the relationship is positive and spans across all six analyses. In the case of 
sex of the respondent, as would be expected, men are more likely than women to engage 
in behaviors such as identifying with a political party, talking about politics, working for 
campaigns, and attending municipal meetings; the difference between men and women is 
insignificant for voting and petition signing. Ideology also plays a role in determining 
whether a person participates in conventional political life or not. Most notably, 
compared to those Colombians who opted not to self-place on the ideological spectrum, 
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those who did, regardless of where they placed, are in general, significantly more likely 
to participate in all activities aside from voting. Citizens who identify as more rightist 
(placing themselves as 7, 8, 9, or 10 on the 1 to 10 scale) are marginally more likely to 
vote than are Colombians who did not provide a valid response. Wealthier citizens (in 
terms of household goods) are less likely to have signed a petition, but more likely than 
their less wealthy compatriots to identify with a political party, or to have worked for a 
campaign. Finally, while sociotropic economic evaluations have no discernible effect on 
political participation, the above analyses do suggest that more politically knowledgeable 
citizens are more likely to have reported voting, identify with a political party, and have 
attended a municipal meeting in the past year; these results are consistent with previous 
research on mass political behavior in both the United States and around the world.  
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Figure IV.7. Predicted probabilities of having worked for a campaign by type of municipality, 2004-
2010. 95% confidence intervals displayed in brackets. 
 
Returning to the variables of interest, state presence, Federation presence, and the 
interaction between the two, Figure IV.7 presents the predicted probabilities of an 
“average” Colombian having worked for a candidate or party during a political campaign 
for each type of municipality. In municipalities where there is one strong institutional 
actor, either the state or the Federation, the probability of a citizen having worked for a 
campaign is highest; indeed, in the low state/high Federation municipality, the likelihood 
of having worked for a party or candidate is 0.27 while in municipalities considered to be 
high state/low Federation, the probability is 0.18. In municipalities where both 
institutional actors have a low presence, the probability of partaking in this type of 
activity is 0.11 while it is in municipalities where both the presence of the Federation and 
 
 
123
state are considered to be high where the probability of working for a campaign is lowest 
at a mere 0.06. 
The second conventional political activity where the conditional presence of the 
FNCC has a significant impact on citizen participation is attending municipal meetings. 
As has become routine throughout the analyses, citizens living in municipalities 
considered to have low state and high Federation presences are the most likely to report 
having participated in this type of behavior in the past 12 months. However, the results 
diverge from previous analyses once we take not of the other municipality types. Instead 
of being statistically indistinguishable from LS/HF municipalities, citizens living in 
HS/LF municipality types are significantly less likely to have reported attending a 
municipal meeting in the past year. A possible explanation for this result could be that in 
LS/HF municipalities, citizens equate FNCC meetings with local government, and as a 
result inflate the number of municipal meetings they have attended.  
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Figure IV.8. Predicted probabilities of having attended a municipal meeting in the past 12 months, 
2005-2010. 95% confidence intervals displayed in brackets. 
 
In 21st century Colombia, the conditional effect of the presence of the FNCC on 
conventional political behaviors while not pivotal is certainly existent. At least in terms 
of working for a political campaign and attending municipal meetings, citizens living in 
LS/HF municipalities are more likely to engage in these behaviors than are citizens living 
in other types of municipalities. Indeed, for both types of behaviors, citizens living in 
LS/HF municipality types are significantly more likely to take part in these activities than 
are Colombians who live in municipalities where both institutions have weak or non-
existent presences. Again, this difference can be reasonably attributed to the presence (or 
lack of presence) of the Coffee Federation, providing further evidence that in important 
ways the FNCC affects citizens’ involvement with the government and lends the 
government legitimacy in municipalities where the state presence might be less than 
optimal. Another important aspect of Latin American corporatism is the role it had (or 
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still has) on deemphasizing participation in activities that would be considered to be 
unconventional. The next section examines the effect of the FNCC on both participation 
in and approval for such modes of behavior.  
 
Measuring and Explaining Unconventional Political Behavior 
 In exchange for receiving benefits such as subsidies, a monopoly on membership, 
and official status from governments, Latin American corporations throughout the 20th 
century were expected to assist governments in discouraging politically disruptive 
behaviors by citizens. Of course, this arrangement was put into place prior to the dual 
transition, and since that time countries in the region, in addition to embracing (to an 
extent), open-market economic reforms, have also begun to encourage democratic forms 
of political participation outside the traditional sort, including the freedom of citizens to 
participate in peaceful forms of protest and demonstrations. 
 Although over 20 years have passed since the dual transition swept across the 
region and since Colombia ratified a new constitution whose primary goal was to end the 
lingering effects of the National Front and encourage citizen participation in politics, 
corporatist institutions, at least in Colombia have continued to exist and affect mass 
opinions and behaviors. Therefore, in this section, I examine the extent to which the 
presence of the corporatist FNCC in a municipality affects the likelihood of a citizen 
having participated in a protest. Between 2004 and 2008 a standard question asked in the 
LAPOP surveys in Colombia was, “At some point in your life, have you participated in a 
demonstration or public protest?”6 Figure IV.9 presents the percentage of respondents, 
                                                        
6 The original wording in Spanish for this questions is: “¿Alguna vez en su vida ha participado Ud. en una 
manifestación o protesta pública? ¿Lo ha hecho algunas veces, casi nunca o nunca?” 
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for each municipality that responded “sometimes (algunas veces)” as opposed to “almost 
never (casi nunca)” or “never (nunca)”. The percentage of respondents in the 
municipalities included in the dataset ranges from 0% in Abejorral (Antioquia) to 33.3% 
in Pasto, the capital city of the department of Nariño. The municipalities of Armenia 
(Quindío) and Bello (Antioquia) also have rates of protest participation exceeding 30% of 
respondents. 
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Figure IV.9. Percentage of respondents having participated in a 
protest or public demonstration by municipality, 2004-2008 
Figure IV.10. Average levels of approval for other to participate in 
legal protests and demonstrations by municipality, 2004-2010 
 
 
128
  
 Clearly, few citizens in any democratic society choose to participate in a protest 
or public demonstration. Whether because of lack of interest, lack of time, or another 
reason altogether, most citizens will go their entire lives without partaking in this mode 
of participation. Given the (relatively) large investment that participation in a protest 
requires, here I present another, less complex measure to gauge the conditional effects of 
the FNCC on protest. Since 2004, LAPOP surveys have asked Colombians the extent to 
which they approve or disapprove “people participat[ing] in legal demonstrations.” 
Figure IV.10 presents mean responses on a 0 to 100 scale for each municipality. 
Throughout the municipalities included in the dataset, support for this form of political 
behavior is relatively high; indeed in no municipality does the average local level of 
support fall below 50 points on the 0 to100 scale while support in eight municipalities 
meets or exceeds 70 points.  
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 Protest Participation Support for Protest 
   
Constant -3.9489*** 
(0.3571) 
59.2472*** 
(3.2870) 
Contextual Level    
FNCC Presence -9.0115^ 
(5.2169) 
40.6176 
(44.1123) 
State Presence 0.0111 
(0.0549) 
-0.0112 
(0.5378) 
FNCC*State  3.4519^ 
(1.8588) 
-19.375 
(15.9816) 
UBN 0.0020 
(0.0031) 
-0.0174 
(0.0306) 
Coffee Area -0.0004 
(0.0111) 
0.0275 
(0.1157) 
Homicide Rate 0.0026 
(0.0028) 
0.0296 
(0.0271) 
Individual Level Variables   
Education 0.63678*** 
(0.0767) 
4.4827*** 
(0.6993) 
Age 0.0726* 
(0.0359) 
-0.1605 
(0.3402) 
Leftist Ideology 0.8701*** 
(0.1747) 
3.4693* 
(1.6212) 
Center Ideology 0.4951** 
(0.1593) 
2.0234 
1.3852 
Rightest Ideology 0.4078** 
(0.1555) 
1.3178 
(1.3048) 
Agricultor -0.0862 
(0.1482) 
-1.6863 
(1.3594) 
Peon -0.1764 
(0.2307) 
0.0022 
(1.9898) 
Female -0.3149*** 
(0.0954) 
-3.3105*** 
(0.9127) 
Wealth 0.0473 
(0.0338) 
-0.2576 
(0.3318) 
Sociotropic Evaluation -0.0058** 
(0.0022) 
-0.0283 
(0.0214) 
Political Knowledge 0.0036* 
(0.0019) 
 
0.0340* 
(0.0170) 
Variance Components   
     Level 1 (Individual) 
     Level 2 (Municipality) 
     Level 3 (Year) 
 
 
 
888.598 
33.9378 
0.000 
   
N obs, levels 1, 2, and 3  4,470; 231; 5 4,871; 323; 7 
Log likelihood -1690.60 -23517.94  
   
Table IV.2. Column one presents results of hierarchical non-linear (logistic) models;                              
column two presents results of a hierarchical linear model. Standard errors in parentheses.    
^p>.1 *p>.05 **p>.01 
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 Results of analyses explaining both participation in and support for public 
demonstrations and protests are presented in Table IV.2. Not only do the contextual 
variables of interest fail to reach statistical significance in explaining support for citizens 
to engage in legal protests and public demonstrations, but none of the contextual 
explanatory variables are significant predictors. At the individual-level, education and 
political knowledge are positive predictors in explaining support for legal protest 
participation. Leftist citizens hold higher levels of support for legal protest participation 
than do those who do not align themselves ideologically and women are, on average, less 
supportive of protest participation than are men.  
Turning to explaining actual protest participation, the results from the analysis 
above are more robust than were the results associated with support for legal protest 
participation. First, in terms of individual-level predictors in explaining protest 
participation throughout out Colombia, we find that education and political knowledge 
are positive predictors of whether one chooses to partake in a protest or demonstration. 
Likewise, women are less likely to have participated in a protest or demonstration than 
are men while Colombians who self-place anywhere on the ideological spectrum (left, 
right, or center) are more likely to report having protested than are those who do not align 
themselves ideologically.7 Finally, more negative views of the national economy 
(sociotropic evaluation) are associated with participation in protests or public 
demonstrations.  
 Of more direct interest to the research question at hand, the interaction between 
the state presence and FNCC presence obtains a marginal level of significance (p=0.06) 
                                                        
7 Colombians placing themselves on the left ideologically are also significantly more likely to have 
participated in a protest or public demonstration compared to Colombians self-placing on the right or center 
of the ideological spectrum. 
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in explaining participation in protests. Also, while the state presence variable does not 
achieve statistical significance, FNCC presence is significant at the .10 level.  However, 
given that these results are from a non-linear regression analysis, it is difficult to discern 
the independent effect of any one variable just from the estimated coefficients. Figure 
IV.11 below presents the predicted probabilities of an average Colombian in each type of 
municipality participating in protests or demonstrations.  
 
 
Figure IV.11. Predicted probabilities of having taken part in protest by type of municipality, 2004-
2008. 95% confidence intervals displayed in brackets. 
 
 The probabilities depicted in Figure IV.11 are striking. Although, as expected, the 
overall probabilities of participating in a protest are quite low, never exceeding 0.13, 
there are clear distinctions between the municipality types. However, different from the 
previous analyses, the differences are not between municipalities with one strong 
 
 
132
institutional presence and two or no strong institutions, but between those with a high 
FNCC presence and those with a low presence. In municipalities where the Coffee 
Federation is considered to have a low institutional presence, the probability of an 
average Colombian reporting having participated in a protest or demonstration at least 
“sometimes” (compared to “almost never” or “never”) is about 0.13 while in 
municipalities with a high FNCC presence, the likelihood of the same Colombian falls to 
0.04 (in LS/HF municipalities) and 0.07 (in HS/HF municipalities).  
 In terms of at least one type of unconventional political behavior (protest) the 
institutional presence of the Coffee Federation, conditional on state presence has a 
notable impact. However, the effect does not hold when explaining approval for people 
participating in legal protests and demonstrations. In the next section, before concluding, 
I will offer a brief discussion of the empirical finding from this chapter. 
 
Discussion and Conclusion  
 
 In 20th century Latin America, a primary motivation for the creation and support 
of corporations was to affect political participation. As scholars of corporatism in the 
1970s noted, citizens in countries with less than democratic governments were often 
times “funneled” into state-approved institutions that were commonly organized around 
democratic values and principles and where they could (to an extent) engage in 
democratic and civic behaviors. However, since the peak-days of Latin American 
corporatism in the 1960s and 70s, much has changed throughout the region leaving some 
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to believe that corporatist groups and organizations, should they continue to exist at all, 
are nothing more than archaic and non-influential institutions of the past.  
  As has been the overarching goal of this dissertation, in this chapter, using the 
non-obvious case of the Colombian Coffee Federation, I seek to demonstrate that even in 
a 21st century electoral democracy, corporatist structure continues to affect how citizens 
interact within their political systems. A key argument of this project that differs from 
much of the corporatist literature in Latin America is that to truly understand how 
corporatism continues to influence the political lives of citizens, one must scale down the 
analysis and examine corporatism at the sub-national level. 
 Here I examine how corporatism at the municipal-level affects citizens’ political 
behaviors. Conventional wisdom may conclude that as the world transitioned into a new 
century, the influence of the FNCC in Colombian municipalities should decrease in terms 
of its political, economic, and social stature. After all, since 1991 the Colombian political 
structure has been guided by a constitution that is explicit in its support for mass 
participation in political processes and whose primary mission was to rid the country of 
the lingering effects of the National Front. Furthermore, as the geopolitical priorities of 
the United States and Western Europe shifted following the collapse of the Berlin Wall 
and the conclusion of the Cold War, support for the International Coffee Agreement 
dissolved and with it, as did the extraordinary benefits afforded to the FNCC and 
Colombian Coffee industry more generally.  
 While the FNCC has had to take steps to reduce and restructure, a priority that has 
remained is the substantial presence it has throughout the primary coffee-growing areas 
of the country. Also, the national government has recognized the benefit of maintaining a 
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strong and vibrant FNCC, not only to represent Colombia in an official capacity abroad, 
but also to assist in tasks normally under the purview of the state, such as infrastructure 
development, healthcare, and education. Additionally, although in recent years the 
Colombian government has made an official effort to increase state presence throughout 
the country, the reality is that even in 2013, municipal and local governments are often 
times perceived as inept, corrupt, or simply inefficient, contrasted with a Coffee 
Federation that is, at least among many perceived as being completely opposite. 
 The realities described above beg the question, to what extent might the Coffee 
Federation affect political behaviors in the 21st century? As has become common 
throughout the comparative politics literature, in order to answer this question, I make a 
conceptual distinction between behaviors considered to be conventional and 
unconventional. As was mentioned above, much has changed in Colombia since political 
elites instituted a consociational governing agreement in 1958 that sought to decrease 
partisanship and as a result, at least according to Hartlyn (1987), decreased conventional 
forms of behavior. In 21st century Colombia, conventional behaviors such as voting, 
petition signing, and party identification are not only tolerated, but encouraged. Therefore, 
in this chapter, I argue that in terms of conventional behaviors, in areas where the FNCC 
truly acts as an alternative government, participation will be high. In areas where the 
Federation acts more in line with a traditional civic organization and fulfills a 
complementary role to the state, instead of substituting, we will see the highest levels of 
participation. The evidence presented in this chapter suggests that for the LS/HF 
municipalities, participation in conventional behaviors is as expected, however in 
municipalities where the Federation and the state both have high presences, the likelihood 
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of participating in conventional behaviors is low. This last result, in light of the results 
presented in Chapter III suggests that in HS/HF municipalities the relationship between 
the two institutional actors may not be complementary one, but perhaps a more 
adversarial or competitive relationship. This is a topic that I will return to in the 
concluding chapter.  
 The results of the effects of the presence of the Coffee Federation conditional to 
the presence of the state in explaining unconventional behaviors differ substantially from 
the conventional behavior analyses. In sum, a citizen living in a municipality where the 
FNCC has a strong presence is less likely to have participated in a protest at least 
“sometimes” compared to an identical Colombian living in a municipality with a weak or 
nonexistent FNCC presence. As has been discussed here, it was a typical responsibility of 
corporations in Latin America to discourage and prevent citizens from engaging in 
behaviors not supported by the government. Although data do not exist to measure how 
successful the Coffee Federation was at discouraging protest participation during the 
height of its influence, the results presented in this chapter suggest that a corporatist 
legacy exists in municipalities where the Coffee Federation continues to be a significant 
institutional actor. 
 The primary motivation of this chapter was to examine the possibility that over 20 
years after the implementation of the dual transition in Latin America, corporatism in the 
region still affects the political lives of citizens. Using the case of the National Coffee 
Federation at the municipal-level, I find evidence that the organization does influence 
how people interact with the state politically, both through conventional and 
unconventional means. Taken together with the results of Chapter III it becomes clear 
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that the FNCC continues to be a relevant and significant political actor in 21st century 
Colombia. The next chapter ties the empirical results from this dissertation together with 
the theoretical expectations and offers conclusions regarding the overall impact of the 
FNCC on citizens’ behaviors and attitudes in the modern day.  
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The idea that institutions shape how people perceive of and interact with their 
government and political systems is not a new one in the social sciences. Indeed, since 
the advent of contemporary political science in the 1950s and 60s, scholars have been 
interested in understanding how ecological factors affect individual-level attitudes and 
behaviors. In this dissertation, I contribute to this large and distinguished body of 
research by examining how institutions created and consolidated during the pre-dual 
transition era of Latin America continue to not only exist in the 21st century, but thrive 
and affect citizens’ behaviors and attitudes concerning the fragile democracies of the 
region. 
 Through the subnational analysis of Colombia’s National Federation of Coffee-
Growers, this dissertation set out to understand the continued influence of corporatist 
institutions on individual-level political behaviors and attitudes. Although corporatist 
organizations may not have the influence in national-level politics that they had prior to 
the third wave of democratization, here I demonstrate that in 21st century Latin America, 
corporate groups, and corporatism in general, still play an important role in the political 
development of the region. However, to notice these effects, one must go beyond the 
national or cross-national level of analysis and look to see how corporatism influences 
citizens through subnational channels. 
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 In addition to reviewing the primary findings from the previous chapters, here, I 
also discuss how the research presented in this dissertation contributes to a small, yet 
growing literature on past institutions that continue to affect the democratization process 
in countries whose democracies can still be considered “consolidating.” Finally, before 
concluding, I discuss briefly avenues which could be taken to extend both the current 
research on the effects of the FNCC and, more generally, subnational institutions on 
citizen engagement with and attitudes toward their constantly changing democratic 
systems.  
 
Corporatism and Mass Behaviors and Attitudes 
 
 Scholars since the 1970s have argued that corporatist organizations were created 
in Latin America to influence how citizens interacted with and perceived of their 
governments. Of course in those times, the vast majority of Latin American governments 
were not democratic and had a clear interest in creating a buffer between themselves and 
the masses. Unfortunately, because of both the lack of transparency and survey research 
in the region during this time, scholars were largely constrained to putting forth untested 
arguments and hypotheses concerning the effects of corporatism on political behaviors 
and attitudes. 
 In the 30 years since the beginning of the third wave of democratization in Latin 
America, much has changed throughout the region. However, although electoral 
democracy and open-market economic systems are now the, the institutions that were 
created before the dual transitions continue to influence politics and society throughout 
  139
the hemisphere. Using contemporary public opinion data, I find that the FNCC affects 
how citizens perceive of their government and behave within the political system. In 
municipalities where the Coffee Federation is the sole strong institutional presence, 
citizen trust in both the national and municipal government is roughly equal to that of 
municipalities where the state is the strongest institutional actor. Furthermore, as would 
be expected, in municipalities where both institutions are considered to be weak, trust in 
government is comparatively low. In considering the counterfactual that if the FNCC did 
not maintain its strong presence in the municipalities considered to be Low State/High 
Federation, then the expected values of trust in government would fall to levels similar to 
those found in Low State/High Federation municipalities. In this sense, from the analysis 
presented in Chapter III, the Federation lends a significant level of legitimacy to the state 
in terms of citizen trust in government. A similar relationship exists when examining 
Colombians’ satisfaction with local services. In general, I find that the predicted levels of 
satisfaction with local services in municipalities with a strong Federation presence and 
weak state presence is about 20 points higher than in municipalities with low presences of 
both the Federation and the state.  
 In the analyses presented in Chapter IV, I find that the presence of the FNCC, 
relative to that of the state, affects significantly citizens’ propensity to act within 
Colombian political life. Here I find evidence that the presence of the Coffee Federation 
affects both conventional and unconventional forms of political participation, although 
not in the same way. For citizens who live in municipalities where the FNCC is 
considered to have a strong presence and the state a weak one, the probability of having 
worked for a campaign or candidate is about 0.27, compared to 0.18 for an identical 
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Colombian living in a HS/LF municipality. In contrast, the probability of having working 
for a campaign or candidate for a citizen living in a LS/LF municipality is just 0.11 while 
in HS/HF municipalities, it is 0.06. Also, citizens living in LS/HF municipalities are more 
likely than Colombians in any other type of municipality to have reported attending a 
municipal meeting in the past twelve months.   
 Alternatively, while the presence of the Coffee Federation in a municipality does 
not significantly affect citizens’ attitudes regarding support for others to engage in legal 
protests or public demonstrations, it does affect whether one actually does participate in 
such an event. Indeed, citizens living in municipalities where the FNCC is considered to 
have a strong presence (regardless of the presence of the state) are almost half as likely to 
report having participated in a protest or public demonstration than are citizens living in 
municipalities with little or no Federation presence.  
 The results presented in Chapters III and IV and summarized below in Tables V.1 
and V.2 suggest not only that corporatist institutions continue to affect individual-level 
behaviors and attitudes, but that they matter at all. As I explained in the first chapter, 
while scholars such as Phlippe Schmitter, Robert Erikson, and James Malloy theorized on 
the effects of corporatism on individual-level outcomes in the 1970s, because of various 
constraints, these arguments went largely untested. In this dissertation, I present evidence 
that even in an environment of democratic institutions and open-market economies, 
corporatist organizations continue to affect how citizens perceive of their governments 
and act within political life. 
 As Table V.1 shows, in municipalities where the FNCC acts as an “alternative 
government” (LS/HF), citizens are, on average, trusting of the government and satisfied 
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with the local services being provided in the municipality. It is reasonable to expect that 
if the Federation were not present in these municipalities, general levels of trust and 
satisfaction among citizens would be similar to the relatively low levels found in the Low 
State/Low Federation municipality-type. Therefore, in terms of legitimacy, the results 
suggest that the state benefits from having the Federation in municipalities where it does 
not have a significant presence. 
 
Table V.1. Summary of Findings for Attitudes and Perceptions. 
 
  In addition to lending legitimacy to the state, another pillar of corporatist 
institutions prior to the dual transition in Latin America was to discourage citizens 
from participating directly in political life. In 21st century Latin America where 
governments are at least electorally democratic, the state depends on a minimal 
amount of citizen participation. Therefore, I hypothesize that in municipalities 
where the Federation has a significant presence, the likelihood of participating in 
conventional political behaviors will be higher; however in those municipalities 
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where the FNCC is a strong actor, I find that participation in non‐conventional 
behaviors is lower. This suggests that the corporatist organization continues to 
influence citizen participation in the political world. Table V.2 below summarizes 
these findings. 
 
Figure V.2. Summary of Findings for Behaviors. 
 
 Although the results of this dissertation suggest that corporatism in subnational 
Colombia continues to influence citizens’ attitudes, perceptions, and behaviors, an 
expectation that was not supported by the empirical analyses, was that concerning 
citizens living in high state/high Federation municipalities. I discuss these findings more 
in-depth below. 
 
Explaining High State/High Federation Municipalities 
 
 A key argument made at the beginning of the dissertation was that, compared to 
other municipality types, High State/High Federation municipalities would have, on 
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average, the highest levels of trust in government, and satisfaction with local services. 
Furthermore, Colombians in these municipalities would be the most likely to participate 
in conventional political activities and least likely to protest. This argument developed 
from the notion that in HS/HF municipalities residents would essentially be receiving the 
best of both worlds: a highly competent and efficient state presence that would deliver 
reliable, high-quality public services along with an active and influential civic society 
organization that would step in during times of government failure and serve as a robust 
“school of democracy” where citizens would learn and perfect democratic activities 
before applying them to the political realm. The results presented in the empirical 
chapters however, suggest a reality that quite different from the hypothesized one 
described above. Indeed, for both the three measures of trust in government and 
satisfaction with local services, the average predicted level on the 0 to 100 scale for 
HS/HF is among the lowers of the four types of municipalities. Similarly, Colombians 
living in municipalities where both the state the FNCC are considered to have strong 
presences are among the least likely to partake in certain conventional political activities.  
 Clearly, the argument laid out in Chapter II that in HS/HF municipalities the 
FNCC serves as a complementary institution to the state does not hold up to the results 
presented in Chapters III and IV. Instead, it appears that competitive relationship between 
the institutional actors in HS/HF municipalities may exist. Different from LS/HF 
municipalities where the FNCC essentially substitutes the state, in HS/HF municipalities, 
a situation of “coproduction” emerges between the two where “both state and nonstate 
actors contribute inputs” (Tsai 2011, 48). In this situation, while the public may welcome 
the involvement of the nonstate actor,  
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From the state’s point of view, the participation of nonstate actors in 
public goods provision may be a double-edged sword. On the one hand, 
the state often save financial and administrative resources when nonstate 
actors contribute to the funding and organizing of local public goods and 
services such as roads, irrigation infrastructure and sanitation services. On 
the other hand, as nonstate actors set up institutions to mobilize resources 
and supervise service delivery, they may also develop into political 
competitors. Citizens may start to question the usefulness and legitimacy 
of a state that fails to take sufficient responsibility for basic public goods 
and services that are central to social welfare. (Tsai 2011, ibid).  
 
 Therefore, for Colombia and the FNCC, the effects of the organization 
may differ depending of municipality type. In municipalities where the FNCC 
effectively supplants the state (LS/HF), the effects of the FNCC on citizens’ 
attitudes, perceptions, and behaviors is, generally speaking, a net positive for the 
state. In these municipalities it appears that residents may equate the work of the 
Federation for work being done by the state, leaving residents to be both satisfied 
with the public services as well as trusting of the multiple levels of government. 
Alternatively, in municipalities where the state and the FNCC are both considered 
to be strong (HS/HF), not only do residents distinguish between the two, but they 
fault the state for perceived shortcomings, affecting overall legitimacy of the 
government and causing citizens to withdraw from political life.  
 The empirical results from this dissertation not only demonstrate that the Coffee 
Federation in Colombia plays a significant role in the political lives of Colombians, but 
also provides evidence that Latin American corporatism affects how citizens perceive of 
and interact with the political institutions of the country. Throughout the country, the 
presence of the Coffee Federation in many municipalities translates into an increase in 
trust in municipal and national governments, as well as increased satisfaction with the 
provision of local services in areas where the state is considered to be weak. Furthermore, 
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while increasing citizen involvement in conventional modes of political participation, the 
presence of the FNCC appears to discourage citizens from engaging in protests and 
public demonstrations. The results suggest that in the era of electoral and procedural 
democracy in 21st century Latin America, corporatist organizations continue to manipulate 
or influence public opinion and mass behaviors in way that can generally be 
characterized as beneficial for the government.  
 In the 1970s, eminent scholars of Latin American politics such as Philippe 
Schmitter and James Malloy argued persuasively that corporatist-style state-society 
relations affected how citizens in the region interacted with their governments. However, 
due to the constraints of the times these arguments went largely untested. While it is 
impossible to go back in time and test the hypotheses laid out by these political scientists, 
in this dissertation I adapt the institutional argument of corporatism developed in the 
1970s and, through empirical analyses, demonstrate that at least at the subnational level 
in Colombia, this institutional arrangement affects individual-level democratic attitudes 
and behaviors in the 21st century. Although this dissertation examines only one corporate 
group in one country, it is not beyond the realm of possibility, and is perhaps even likely, 
that similar arrangements and effects exist in countries that were, or still are, considered 
to have strong corporatist institutions and identities in the region such as Mexico, Brazil, 
or Argentina.  
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Studying the Continued Effects of Institutions of the Past 
 
 The findings from this dissertation contribute to a small, yet growing literature 
that examines the effects of past institutions on citizens’ political behaviors and attitudes. 
Brusco et al. (2004), for example, find that depending on when an Argentine citizen 
attained voting-age status affects the likelihood of selling his or her vote for material 
goods; the institutional shift to neoliberal economic policies in the early 1990s created a 
sense of loyalty to the clientelistic party structure among those Argentine’s who became 
electorally-active during this time. “Most prone to ‘vote selling’ are young, low-income 
Peronists, people who entered the electorate during the Menem era. These were the kinds 
of people who were frequently hurt by the high unemployment and reduced services 
entailed in Menem’s neoliberal reforms” (Brusco et al. 2004, 83).  Similarly, Pop-Eleches 
and Tucker (2011, 2012) identify mechanisms through which the legacy of Communism 
influences mass behaviors and attitudes in countries where this governmental and 
economic system was shed over two decades ago. Whether through social, socio-
demographic, differing economic and political institutions or outcomes, a shadow of 
Communism continues to cast itself over large parts of Europe, “In the world outside the 
post-communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, 
younger, more educated, and more democratically inclined citizens tend to have a left-
wing bias in terms of self-placement on a standard left-right scale. In post-communist 
countries, however, it is the opposite” (Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2012, 157). Even years 
after their supposed demise, recent scholarship has demonstrated that institutions 
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continue to influence how citizens behave within and perceive of their governments and 
democratic systems.   
 In key ways the research presented in this dissertation extends the theoretical and 
empirical findings discussed above. First, until now, research on the continued impact of 
past institutions on citizens’ behaviors and attitudes has tended to be centered on national 
and cross-national explanations. As expounded upon in Chapter I, the current project 
recognizes and explains important variation in institutional presences at the subnational 
level. Just as the effect of corporatism can be, in part, explained by municipal context, it 
is also possible that communism’s effect in Europe and neoliberalism’s effect in 
Argentina also varies along subnational lines. Second, and perhaps more importantly, this 
dissertation demonstrates that some institutions of the past not only continue to influence 
citizens through a “legacy” effect, but are indeed thriving in post-dual transition 21st 
century. As scholars continue to seek to understand how institutions affect democratic 
development and consolidation, it should be remembered that institutions that were 
created in previous eras may be more dynamic and robust than originally thought.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
 This dissertation has contributed to our understanding of how institutions in 
developing countries affect citizens’ attitudes and behaviors. It speaks to a number of 
different literatures spanning across various disciplines and sub-disciplines including 
comparative political behavior, political institutions, and political sociology. Finally, the 
research described in these pages advances our knowledge on the role of the National 
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Federation of Colombian Coffee-Growers on that country’s political and democratic 
development. However, it would be a mistake to consider this research the final word on 
either the role of subnational corporatism, or even the FNCC.  
 Here I have relied heavily on the use of quantitative methods and econometric 
techniques to understand the ecological effects of the FNCC on Colombians’ behaviors 
and attitudes. While the quantitative results presented here suggest a relationship between 
the FNCC’s presence and citizen behaviors and attitudes, this project would benefit from 
a more qualitative component. Through semi-structured interviews and focus groups, it 
would be possible to uncover the mechanisms in which the Federation affects citizens 
within a municipality. Are those who associate with the FNCC more affected by its 
presence than those who do not? Are respondents who work directly in the coffee sector 
more likely to be influenced by the Federation than those who work in more peripheral 
occupations or outside of the coffee and agricultural sector all together? Does living in 
one area of a municipality affect the influence the FNCC has on a Colombian? All of 
these questions would be difficult to answer through survey research, however, with well-
designed and carefully executed qualitative research methods, I could begin to understand 
the varying levels of influence the Federation has, not only across municipalities, but 
within them.  
 Clearly, the conclusions presented here speak directly to only one case, the 
National Coffee Federation in Colombia. Do similar relationships exist in other 
countries? What about in countries that are traditionally more corporatist than Colombia? 
What about other subnational institutions? While the actual empirical approach used in 
this dissertation would have to be modified and would not be able to be applied exactly as 
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is for other cases or other countries, this research does present a strategy for 
systematically assessing institutional presence at the subnational-level and then assessing 
how that presence affects individuals’ behaviors and attitudes. As comparative politics 
continues to understand the role of subnational context within the larger political 
environment, analyses such as this one will become ever more important and more useful 
within a broader research agenda. 
 Notwithstanding the continued research opportunities described above, this 
dissertation makes an important contribution not only to our understanding of Colombian 
politics and society, but also to how we understand and conceptualize how subnational 
institutions affect citizens’ political behaviors and attitudes. In sum, this dissertation finds 
that at the subnational level, corporatism not only continues to exist in 21st century Latin 
America, but that it influences citizens in ways that would be consistent with the 
theorizing of scholars from the 1970s. As the region continues down its path of 
democratization, scholars should continue to keep in mind how institutions of the past 
may continue to survive and how these institutions might affect the political development 
of the countries in the region.  
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APPENDIX A. 
 
 
 
DESCRIPTION OF INDVIDUAL-LEVEL VARIABLES 
 
  
Variable  Question Wording or 
explanation 
N Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max 
Dependent Variables      
Trust in 
Municipal 
Government 
“To what point do you trust in 
your municipal government?” 
7,145 53.14 30.65 0 100 
Trust in 
Departmental 
Government 
“To what point do you trust in 
your departmental government? 
3,995 58.97 28.29 0 100 
Trust in 
National 
Government  
“To what point do you trust in 
the national government?” 
7,107 62.82 30.02 0 100 
Satisfaction 
with 
Municipal 
Services 
“Would you say that the 
services that the municipality is 
providing to the people are very 
good, good, neither good nor 
bad, bad, or very bad? 
7,215 54.80 20.77 0 100 
Vote “Did you vote en the last 
presidential elections? (1=yes) 
7,276 0.66 0.47 0 1 
Party 
Identification 
“In this moment, do you identify 
with a political party?” (1=yes) 
5,193 0.31 0.46 0 1 
Petition Respondent report having 
petitioned a government official 
in the past year. 
7,315 0.31 0.46 0 1 
Talk about 
Politics 
Respondent reported having 
tried to convince somebody to 
vote for a particular candidate at 
least “sometimes” 
7,277 0.26 0.44 0 1 
Work for 
Campaign 
“Did you work for a party or 
candidate during the last 
presidential elections?” (1=yes) 
7,183 0.14 0.35 0 1 
Attend 
Municipal 
Meeting 
“Have you attended an open 
meeting or municipal council 
session in the past 12 months?” 
(1=yes) 
6,203 0.11 0.31 0 1 
Independent Variables      
Education Level of formal education (by 
cohort). 
7,309 1.85 0.82 0 3 
Age Respondents’ age in years  7,314 2.63 1.43 1 6 
Leftist 
Ideology 
The respondent self-placed as 1, 
2, 3 or 4 on the 1-10 ideological 
scale. 
7,315 0.14 0.34 0 1 
Centrist 
Ideology 
The respondent self-placed as 5 
or 6 on the 1-10 ideological 
7,315 0.29 0.45 0 1 
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scale 
Rightest 
Ideology 
The respondent self-placed as 7, 
8, 9 or 10 on the 1-10 
ideological scale. 
7,315 0.39 0.49 0 1 
No Ideology 
(reference) 
The respondent did not provide 
a valid response to the question 
asking to self-place on the 
ideological scale 
7,315 0.19 0.39 0 1 
Agricultor Respondent reported occupation 
as being a land-owning farmer  
6,003 0.12 0.32 0 1 
Peon Respondent reported occupation 
as being agricultural worker, 
working on somebody else’s 
land.  
6,003 0.05 0.23 0 1 
Female 1 if female, 0 if male. 7,315 0.50 0.50 0 1 
Wealth Level of wealth measured by 
household goods. By decile 
7,301 3.37 1.64 0 10 
Sociotropic 
Evaluation 
“How would you classify the 
economic situation of the 
country? Would you say that it 
is very good, good, neither good 
nor bad, bad, or very bad?” 
7,264 41.24 20.26 0 100 
Political 
Knowledge 
Additive index of three political 
knowledge questions: current 
president of US; number of 
Colombian departments; length 
of presidential term in Colombia 
6,083 60.31 29.85 0 100 
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APPENDIX B. 
 
 
 
INFORMATION ON SAMPLE DESIGN AND MUNICIPALITIES  
 
  
The individual-level data used in this project came from public opinion surveys 
conducted by the Latin American Public Opinion Project in 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 
2008, 2009, and 2010.1 The samples used for these surveys are probabilistic, stratified, 
and multi-staged with random selection of unites for each stage. They are representative 
of the voting-age, non-institutionalized Colombian population. For each survey round, 
respondents from roughly 55 municipalities were included in the sample; below is a list 
of municipalities (by department) included in the survey and the number of respondents 
for each round. 
Departments Municipalities 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total 
    1,479 1,487 1,491 1,491 1,503 1,493 1,506 10,450 
Antioquia                   
  Medellin 70 70 70 83 70 70 70 503 
  Abejorral 26 26 26 13 26 26 25 168 
  Bello 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 84 
  Caldas 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 182 
  Marinilla 26 26 26 26 26 26 18 174 
Atlantico                   
  Barranquilla 42 42 42 42 42 44 42 296 
  Soledad 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 84 
Bogota                   
  Bogota 231 231 231 231 231 229 231 1615 
Bolivar                   
                                                        
1 Surveys conducted during even years were done as part of the AmericasBarometer, LAPOP’s flagship bi-
annual, 26-country survey project on political culture of democracy in the Americas. The odd years are part 
of a separate agreement between LAPOP, USAID and the Observatorio de la Democracia at the 
Universidad de los Andes to measure political attitudes, behaviors, and perceptions of Colombians on a 
more regular basis. For more information, see www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop.  
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  Cartagena 35 35 35 35 35 36 35 246 
  
San Juan 
Nepomuceno 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 196 
Boyaca                   
  Tunja 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 182 
  Muzo 26 22 26 26 26 26 26 178 
  Sutamarchan 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 182 
Boyaca                   
  Manizales 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 98 
  Manzanares 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 182 
Caqueta                   
  Florencia 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 126 
Cauca                   
  Popayan 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 168 
  Padilla 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 168 
  Rosas 0 0 0 0 12 0 0 12 
Cesar                   
  Valledupar 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 84 
  Pelaya 28 28 28 28 28 28 29 197 
  San Martin 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 196 
Cordoba                   
  Monteria 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 84 
  Ayapel 28 28 28 28 28 27 29 196 
Cundinamarca                   
  Factativa 26 26 26 26 26 26 27 183 
  Soacha 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 84 
Huila                   
  Neiva 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 84 
Magdalena                   
  Santa Marta 14 14 14 14 14 14 15 99 
  Cerro San Antonio 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 196 
Meta                   
  Villavicencio 12 12 12 12 12 6 12 78 
  Guamal 26 26 26 26 26 24 26 180 
Nariño                   
  Pasto 14 14 14 14 14 14 15 99 
  Cumbitara 14 26 14 14 14 26 27 135 
  Sandona 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 168 
Norte de 
Santander                   
  Cucuta 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 168 
Quindío                   
154 
 
  Armenia 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 84 
Risaralda                   
  Pereira 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 112 
  Quinchia 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 182 
  Santuario 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 182 
Santander                   
  Bucaramanga 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 126 
  Confines 26 26 26 26 26 26 27 183 
  Rionegro 26 26 26 26 26 26 27 183 
Sucre                   
  Chalan 16 16 0 0 0 0 0 32 
  Majagual 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 196 
  Morroa 0 0 28 28 28 27 28 139 
Tolima                   
  Ibague 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 98 
  Coyaima 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 182 
  Icononzo 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 182 
Valle de Cauca                   
  Cali 77 77 77 77 77 76 76 537 
  Buga 26 26 26 26 26 26 28 184 
  Florida 24 24 24 24 24 24 25 169 
  Riofrio 24 24 24 24 24 24 26 170 
Casanare                   
  Monterrey 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 182 
Putumayo                   
  Puerto Asis 18 18 18 18 18 18 22 130 
Vaupes                   
  Mitu 18 18 18 18 18 18 14 122 
Table A.1. Municipalities and corresponding number of respondents by survey year 
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